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Hedonic Psychology, Political Theory, and
Law: Is Welfarism Possible?
MARK KELMANt
INTRODUCTION
Legal policymakers and political philosophers confront,
repeatedly and in familiar ways, questions about the
propriety of using utilitarian metrics to evaluate discrete
legal rules and social policy. Utilitarianism is doubtless the
most familiar exemplar of consequentialist welfarism.
Utilitarians are consequentialists in the sense that they
believe that a policy or action should be evaluated solely in
terms of the quality of the state of affairs that will arise if
that policy or action is adopted. They are welfarists in the
sense that the metric they use to judge the quality of the
resulting state of affairs is the metric of "well-being": the
resulting state of affairs is better to the extent that we have
increased the "sum" of how "well-off' the people affected by
the policy or action are. A consequentialist need not try to
maximize welfare. One could, for instance, evaluate one's
personal or political conduct with the goal of minimizing the
number of rights violations that occur in the world. Most of
the familiar attacks on utilitarianism center on the
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was supported by the Stanford Legal Research Fund, made possible by a
bequest from Ira S. Lillick and by gifts from others friends of the Stanford Law
School. I am grateful for comments by Bernie Black, Paul Brest, Dick Craswell,
Barbara Fried, Tom Grey, Daniel Kahneman, Norbert Schwarz, and Jeff
Strnad, as well as participants at workshops at both Harvard and Stanford Law
Schools. Errors, of course, are mine.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
propriety of consequentialism: deontological theorists
attack the notion that an action can be judged solely in
terms of whether it improves some subsequent end-state.
Thus, think of the familiar debate about whether an act
that might be thought to violate X's rights is even
permissible, let alone ethically mandatory, if it would "help"
some individual Y or group of Ys more than it "hurt" X. This
(important) dispute about consequentialism, though, is
completely outside the scope of my inquiry.
What I want to focus on in this piece is welfarism. But
it is not my goal in this piece to evaluate the traditional
utilitarian claim, which has recently been restated with
such vigor in the legal academy by Kaplow and Shavell,
that we should judge the propriety of policies solely by
reference to their welfare effects.' Instead, I want to ask a
more foundational question: to what extent is the concept of
welfare meaningful, rather than problematic and elusive?
Virtually all policymakers, whether they embrace or reject
the notion that only shifts in welfare count in evaluating
policy, believe that welfare effects are relevant, at least on
some occasions. Similarly, in assessing our private actions,
we would typically think it mattered, even if it were not
invariably dispositive, whether we took action that made
1. See Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002).
It is important, though, even at this early stage, to draw a distinction between
two sorts of facially political perfectionist challenges to welfarism. In a broad
sense, perfectionists believe that it is the proper goal of political actors to insure
that people live well-lived lives, or lives that express their "essential human
natures," rather than to facilitate their efforts to live whatever life increases
their subjective well-being. I will address in detail only the second perfectionist
argument in this piece. First, though, one variety of perfectionist might argue
that welfarism itself must ultimately be seen to be perfectionist (despite the
usual sense that perfectionism and welfarism are in stark opposition) simply
because the third party observer's decision to attend to welfare effects can only
be justified by a higher order, foundational belief that people best fulfill their
natures or live well-lived lives if they maximize their well-being. In that sense
the question is whether the basic decision for a third party observer to care
about welfare is just as perfectionist as the more overtly perfectionist third
party decision to care that people's lives are lived in a fashion that maximizes
some moralistic virtue the observer cares for. I will instead be more interested
in whether welfarists are covertly perfectionist in a second sense, though. Is it
possible for the third party observer who claims to care about the well-being of
those he observes simply to observe well-being from the vantage point of the
subjects he observes or will he, inevitably, embody what I will call weak
perfectionist preconceptions about the nature of the good life in attempting to
elicit information about subjective well-being?
[Vol. 52
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someone else "better off," rather than "worse off," or "better
off to a greater, rather than to a lesser, extent."
Welfarists are typically "subjective welfarists"-in the
sense that they believe that a person's welfare depends on
her own attitudes about her experiences-and I will largely
address the subjective welfarist tradition in this paper, for
it is subjective welfarism that is associated with both liberal
political theory and economics. But plainly "objective
welfarism" is possible as well. One might believe that
people themselves are well-off to the extent that they
function in certain ways that are intrinsically good,
independent of their private inclinations. What
differentiates "objective welfarism" from conventional
perfectionism is that what motivates the objective welfarist
to proscribe a particular life canon is entirely his interest in
the quality of life of the subjects themselves; he does not
proscribe such a canon because the subjects are duty-bound
to live a particular way or because the perfectionist herself
feels bound to help realize a particular teleological end-
state, in which people are realizing some underlying nature.
Subjective welfarism is justifiably tempting. It
expresses a noble resistance to the idea that people are
more or less the same, that what is good for Kate must be
good for Jenny too, though they are distinct people who may
have quite distinct grand life plans and quite distinct
quirky little tastes. It also expresses the noble liberal idea
that the question of whether Jenny's life has been a good
one must ultimately be answered (in some sense) from
Jenny's evaluative perspective if we are to respect Jenny as
an autonomous person. There is, though, more ambiguity in
the parenthetical phrase "in some sense" than subjective
welfarists can comfortably accommodate, and that is, in
essence, the subject of this paper. Jenny does not have a
single evaluative perspective: she can reflect on her life in a
host of ways, and our choice to treat one, rather than
another, of these reflective evaluations as privileged in
making judgments about how she has fared ultimately
requires some sort of defense. No subjective welfarist has
ever been up to the task of providing such a defense.
Broadly speaking, subjective welfarists have instead
adopted two strategies, historically, to answer the question
of whether (and to what degree) a person is better off with
one state of affairs than another. The first, associated with
early utilitarians like Jeremy Bentham, is to (try to) look
20041
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directly at sensation. From this perspective, a person is
better off to the extent that she feels more pleasure and less
pain. (Quite conventionally, I refer to this as hedonic
utilitarianism). The second, associated with later
utilitarians and with modern economics, is to look at
preferences: a person is better off if (a certain class of her)
preferences are met or realized, rather than unmet. (Again
following convention, I will refer to this as preference
utilitarianism).
Each of these strategies is deeply flawed: my principal
goal is to sharpen our understanding of the depth of the
flaws. The most marked conceptual problem with hedonic
utilitarianism is that it does not seem to take adequate
account of subjectivity: there is no reason for any particular
subject to care about whether she does or does not
experience any particular set of sensations that we could
describe as "pleasure" or "pain."2 Later utilitarians (and
economists) were driven to preference utilitarianism
precisely for that reason: if, for instance, someone seeks
(prefers) the glory of God to pleasure, why say she is better
off if she instead experiences sensory pleasures?
But preference utilitarianism is just as problematic. At
core, there is a fundamental conceptual problem in
connecting the satisfaction of desire with experienced
utility or well-being:3  desires are prospective and
intentional while well-being is lived and experienced. Some
preferences may be satisfied that we never experience (they
may be fulfilled without our even knowing they have been
fulfilled or after we are dead)4 and others may prove
2. The conceptual point is made quite clearly in many places: an atypically
articulate one is JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT AND
MORAL IMPORTANCE 8 (1986) [hereinafter WELL-BEING).
3. For an excellent discussion of this basic conceptual point, see L. W.
SUMNER, WELFARE, HAPPINESS, AND ETHICS 122-32 (1996). Richard Brandt
rejects preference-utilitarianism (or what he calls a desire theory of welfare) in
favor of hedonic utilitarianism (he calls these happiness theories) for this
reason as well. See RICHARD B. BRANDT, A THEORY OF THE GOOD AND THE RIGHT
246-253 (1979).
4. For example, X strongly desires that his child grow up to be a lawyer; she
does so long after he dies. Her becoming a lawyer fulfills his desire or
preference, but under most plausible theories contributes nothing to his well-
being. Obviously, the knowledge (or growing probabilistic sense) that she was
on the lawyerly path might have given him satisfaction, just as he might have
gotten pleasure from making efforts to realize his goal that she become a
[Vol. 52
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disappointing. Not only is desire-satisfaction not a
sufficient condition for improving well-being, it is not
necessary either; just as we can be disappointed, so can we
experience thoroughly unanticipated pleasures. While one
might readily defend the proposition that there are some
sound political theoretical reasons to respond to expressed
preferences, whether or not such responsiveness increases
subjective welfare, in this piece I endorse a variety of
familiar arguments that the claim that it does inexorably
increase welfare, non-tautologically understood, is a very
weak one.
The most critical point I will try to elucidate is an
obvious implication of the foundational observation that
preferences are intrinsically prospective. Our preferences
are merely predictions about the hedonic states that we will
experience if certain end-states arise; like all predictions,
they can be wrong. Thus, sophisticated preference
utilitarians must try (and have invariably tried) to solve the
problem of "error" by respecting only the sub-class of
preferences most likely to be "correct"-those that are
adequately informed and prudent. But what is critical to
understand is that it is impossible to know when a desire is
either prudent or adequately informed unless we know
whether meeting it turned out to be hedonically satisfying,
and we are drawn to preference utilitarianism precisely
because we believed we could not observe such hedonic
satisfaction directly. Thus, some psychologists (whom I will
dub "the new hedonic psychologists" in this paper) want to
"go back to Bentham" and measure hedonic states directly.
The problem, though, is that the new hedonic psychologists
are no more successful than Bentham was in avoiding the
problem of inadequate subjectivity: there is no particular
reason to believe that all people do or should value, above
all, what the new hedonic psychologists describe as positive
experience.
In Part I of this paper, I begin the detailed discussion
by attempting to assess "hedonic utilitarianism." My first
main goal in that Part is to fortify a series of philosophical
arguments that hedonic utilitarianism cannot cope with two
deep foundational problems. First, it cannot cope with the
argument that it is either covertly illiberally "perfectionist"
lawyer, but the satisfaction of the preference, per se, could not have contributed
to experienced welfare.
2004]
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rather than appropriately subject-centered in assuming
that there is a single variety of experience that everyone
should seek or, more plausibly perhaps, that it is simply
naive in ignoring the problem that people may be well-off
whether or not they have any particular set of feelings.
Second, it is beset by deep methodological problems: good
and bad experiences are neither commensurable nor
capable of being summed over a person's lifetime. I hope to
do so, first, by highlighting the contributions hedonic
psychologists have made to our understanding of the
complexity of the notion of happiness. In this regard, it is
my hope that I will be able to use hedonic psychology to
supplement philosophy.
My second main goal in Part I is to analyze, critically,
the efforts by the new hedonic psychologists to measure
happiness by trying to sum subjects' spontaneous
approach/avoid, continue/desist, good/bad reactions to their
instant circumstances.5 These efforts were in part simply
5. I am interested in this paper, above all, in what could be described as the
most "imperialistic" or all-encompassing claims about welfare that psychologists
like Daniel Kahneman made in his earliest writings on hedonic psychology. To
some considerable extent, Professor Kahneman has adopted a more moderate
position in his later writings that I find less problematic, but in many ways less
interesting. In ways I will try to hint at now, and supplement to some extent
where most relevant, in later footnotes, he now believes that the information
about what he still refers to as "objective happiness" (essentially the sum of
scaled momentary approach/avoid reactions) is not precisely information about
"welfare" or human well-being, but merely one sort of information that a
policymaker interested in welfare should find useful. Especially in this regard,
see Daniel Kahneman, Experienced Utility and Objective Happiness: A Moment-
Based Approach, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 673 (Daniel Kahneman &
Amos Tversky eds., 2000) [hereinafter Kahneman, Experienced Utility]. It is
important to contrast in this regard, "moderate statements" in the later work
with earlier claims. For instance, compare (from the later work): "The concept of
objective happiness is not intended to stand on its own, and is proposed only as
a necessary element of a theory of human well-being .... Objective happiness is
only one constituent of the quality of human life, but it is a significant one." Id.
at 683; and "The present analysis suggests that moment-based measures of the
actual experience of consequences should be included in the assessments of
outcomes and as one of the criteria for the quality of decisions. . . ." Id. at 690,
with this earlier statement:
The present is fleeting, but memories and evaluations of the past
endure and populate the mind. When they think about their lives,
therefore, people have nothing to work with but memorized
assessments and assessments of memories. The central claim of this
chapter has been that the scientific study of enjoyment and suffering
need not be subject to the same constraint. Real-time measures of
experience can be obtained, stored without error, and aggregated to
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responsive to perceived methodological flaws in the "old
hedonic psychology"-which measured subjective welfare by
eliciting responses to broad survey questions about whether
subjects were content with their lives or not. We have very
good reason to be suspicious of these conventional survey-
based reports on subjective well-being-they really may
pose questions that are simply cognitively intractable, even
before we get to the question of whether they are asking
questions about the "right sort" of happiness.
I argue, though, that the new hedonic psychology is
philosophically naive: it is simply not the case that it would
be appropriate to attempt to sum approach/avoid
instantaneous reactions to life events and assume that
those who approach the actual events in their life more
often are "happier" than those who do not. This is true not
only because there is no decent way of summing cardinally
across incident reactions, and therefore accounting for the
intensity of certain experiences; it is dubious as well, more
profoundly, because people do not invariably (and probably
should not) simply seek to maximize this sum. Their
experience of any "life event chunk" is simply not
appropriately conceived of as the sum of momentary pains
and pleasures within those chunks, nor is their experience
of their life as a whole inevitably simply the sum of the
yield a measure of objective well-being that is anchored in the reality of
present experience, not the fallible reconstructions and evaluations of
the past.... A combination of [measurement] methods will eventually
be available to characterize the objective well-being of individuals and
groups... and to provide a criterion for the evaluation of economic and
social policy.
Daniel Kahneman, Objective Happiness, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF
HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 3, 22 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter
WELL-BEING, FOUNDATIONS].
The newer claim is in some ways hard to argue with: so long as the
policymaker "discounts" or "weighs" the information on objective happiness
.appropriately," it is hard to see why she would not want it. But it is also now
much harder to fathom whether (and why) Kahneman believes that a welfarist
should weigh this form of information a good deal (or barely at all) unless he
explains why it "is" in some important sense information about welfare.
Moreover, the later Kahneman is simply less clear than the earlier Kahneman
about the normative status of memories of hedonically charged events: it is
much clearer in the earlier pieces that memory is simply an imperfect recorder
of information that could be stored (by an outside observer/recording
mechanism) accurately, rather than an assembler of a distinct account of life
experiences. Whether or not he in particular still believes that to be the case, it
is an important view to confront.
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hedonic valence of a host of "life chunk" experiences. Some
subjects may privilege (certain forms of) reflective moments
more than others; some may emphasize achievement,
competence, and meaning more than sensation. I argue that
we ultimately must be "weak perfectionists" in measuring
happiness: we need not be strong perfectionists (holding
views about the precise activities people should either like
to do or value) but we must recognize that when we ask
people to evaluate their experience from one of the many
vantage points from which they might evaluate it, we are
implicitly valuing certain attitudes about life more than
others. Philosophical reflection will thus help us see that
efforts to maintain a sharp separation between (subject-
centered) welfarism and (evaluator-driven) perfectionism
inexorably fail. The new hedonic psychologists may believe
they have avoided the pitfalls of conventional Benthamite
hedonic utilitarian thought-they do not assume that
people value any particular sorts of sensations, but allow
people simply to declare whether the state they are in is
worth maintaining or not-but the belief that people who
more frequently have the experience of wanting to
approach, rather than avoid, present activity are better off
is ultimately no more philosophically defensible than claims
that they are better off experiencing certain "pleasurable"
sensations. Thus, in a sense, while my first goal in Part I
was (in essence) to use the findings of psychology to enrich
philosophy, my second goal is to use the philosophical
arguments to enrich psychology.
My third goal is to assess whether hedonic
utilitarianism can be "rescued" by biology: perhaps there is
but one form of happiness that we all (in fact) experience,
and therefore can measure-the feeling that we get that
drives us to make adaptive, pro-survival choices. I will
argue that biology will not likely rescue us here, though my
conclusions are especially cautious in this section, given
what I am sure is my extremely modest comprehension of
the debates among the relevant biologists. First, it is not
clear that unhappiness is a biologically bad state (nor
happiness a good one); thus, it would be misleading to
identify "happy" people as those who were meeting
"survival tasks."' Second, it is not at all obvious that
6. In a sense, my intuition is that some people might be drawn to using
biology to finesse what I dubbed the first perfectionist challenge. See supra note
[Vol. 52
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emotional states play any straightforward, single biological
role if we were instead arguing simply that happiness
(whether deeply functional or not) was a simple single state
attached to the performance of a biological task.
In Part II, I discuss preference utilitarianism. As I
noted, preference utilitarians can readily avoid the hedonic
utilitarians' most transparent error-their tendency to
impute a particular goal to people (the desire to maximize
the excess of momentary "pleasure" over "pain"), whether
they have got it or not. In this respect, they seem to
embrace a philosophy more consistent with the most
attractive aspect of subjective welfarism: its respect for
individual diversity of taste. But preference utilitarians, in
the end, cannot avoid the difficulties of hedonic
utilitarianism; they have merely relocated them.
Preferences are normatively meaningful only to the degree
that they predict future hedonic reactions' and predictions
can be mistaken. Figuring out whether they are likely to be
wrong reintroduces all the descriptive and normative
difficulties of hedonic utilitarianism, innocently hidden in
the concession that we must "correct" preferences to insure
that they are made in procedurally appropriate ways.
What is critical to recognize is that we ultimately have
no way of specifying the general procedural conditions
under which these predictions are markedly more certain to
be right. Maybe they are better when the party making
them is more informed, both about the traits of the concrete
goods or end-states she must choose among or more
informed (in some nearly unfathomable sense) about
herself-except when they are not. In this regard, I will
once more try to use the psychological literature to enrich a
point that some philosophers have repeatedly noted: more
1. In this regard, the argument is that third party evaluators have a non-
controversial reason to be interested in maximizing the welfare of the subjects
they observe: if those subjects are happy, they are fulfilling their biological
destiny (engaging in pro-survival tasks.) Now one could argue that the intuition
is philosophically naive-one should still have to justify why an observer ought
to be happy to find out more people are engaged in survival-adaptive tasks.
Instead, though, I will argue, more narrowly, that there is no biological reason
to think that happier people are more likely to be meeting survival challenges,
even if we could assume that a policymaker should feel that it is unambiguously
good if people are meeting such challenges.
7. I will briefly discuss the fact that there are no welfarist reasons (though
there may well be deontological reasons) to satisfy a preference simply because
it is a preference.
2004]
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information about the external world does not really give us
more information about our preferences, though it may (but
need not) help us meet our preferences, aptly defined. More
information about whether our preferences are self-
defeating is not precisely information at all: to say that
preferences, in this sense, are wrong means they fail to
meet some substantive end (other than the satisfaction of
preferences). It almost surely means nothing more or less
than that satisfying them fails to make us "happy"
according to the hedonimeter that the preference
utilitarians were trying to eschew.8
Similarly, we cannot conclude that preferences are
imprudently formed just because they form differently given
distinct psychological background states. The philosophical
point is that the only real ground for dubbing the choices
made in one state imprudent is that they work out poorly,
according to some non-choice-based criterion. In this regard,
the psychology literature is especially informative in
enriching the conventional philosophical arguments: even if"we" (or some of us) have some poorly defended, covert,
substantively Puritanical notions that what psychologists
describe as "cold" (low arousal) choices are more
procedurally prudent than "hot" (high arousal) choices
(regardless of which sort works out better hedonically, in
the particular situation?), few of us have any intuitions
about a host of other preference-influencing background
conditions. For example, are more diversified one-shot
choices more prudent than less diversified seriatim ones?
8. Ultimately, I will argue that the distinction between information about
the external world and information about the self is less sharp than I imply
here, but it is worth clarifying the initial intuitive distinction. If subject S wants
to get from Palo Alto to San Jose as fast as possible, and chooses to take
Highway 280 rather than 101, he might be mistaken if unaware of the traffic-
stopping accident on 280. (Note that we have attributed a clear end to S, so that
his mistake is plainly about the means of obtaining that end. Note, too, that a
host of other information he might or might not have about 280 and 101--e.g.,
when each road was constructed, details about the road surfaces-would
presumptively be of no moment: what we mean to say, though, in describing the
increased information as unhelpful is that the information would not guide him
to make a choice that led him to be happier.) If he does not "know," though, that
getting there more quickly will not make him happy, compared, say, to driving
on a prettier road, he lacks some sort of self-knowledge. It is ambiguous what it
would mean to be more "informed" about one's own preferences, or that one
would know whether one was "informed enough," unless one were informed
enough to make the choice that actually maximized hedonic utility.
[Vol. 52
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We ultimately must resolve this question (if at all) not by
reflecting on the dictates of procedural prudence but by
sneaking a peek at which sort of choice made people
substantively "happier" ex post. This is one more place
where I hope that the philosophical debates will be clarified
considerably by the findings of psychologists.
But the basic point of this paper is that full-blown
subjective welfarism is not really possible. Preference
utilitarianism both requires and defeats hedonic
utilitarianism (it requires it to give content to the notion of
informed and prudent preference and defeats it by
highlighting the impossibility of canonizing any particular
set of hedonic sensations). At the same time, there is no
variant of hedonic utilitarianism that is either practically
realizable (given the incommensurability of both good and
bad states) or truly non-perfectionist (given the possibility
that self-conception differs depending on the elicitation
method we use to discover subjective states). All of us who
rely to any extent on measuring the welfare of those
affected by the choice of legal rules and policy initiatives-
and a fortiori those who claim that lawyers and
policymakers need attend to nothing but welfare-must
really beware: as currently understood, the concept of
subjective welfare is quite close to empty.
I. HEDONIC UTILITARIANISM, AS EMBODIED IN THE NEW
HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY
A. Introduction: The Development of the New Hedonic
Psychology
Kahneman9 representing what I dub the "new hedonic
psychologists"-is quite explicit in his early writings on
hedonic psychology that he intends to "go back to
Bentham"' by measuring utility directly, rather than
9. See Daniel Kahneman, Peter P. Wakker & Rakesh Sarin, Back to
Bentham? Explorations of Experienced Utility, 112 Q.J. ECON. 375 (1997).
10. See id. Though hedonic utilitarians like Kahneman speak of returning
to utilitarianism's Benthamite roots, there are some indications, highlighted in
an early twentieth century reflection by Wesley Mitchell, that Bentham himself
was aware enough of the problems in "direct utilitarianism" (what I have been
calling hedonic utilitarianism) that he often flirted with variants of preference
utilitarianism. For a good discussion, see Wesley C. Mitchell, Bentham's
20041
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Felicific Calculus, 33 POL. SCI. Q. 161 (1918), reprinted in UTILITY THEORY: A
BOOK OF READINGS 30 (Alfred N. Page ed., 1968).
Mitchell makes two especially salient points: First, Bentham recognized that
one of the key components of the utility of an experience-its intensity-was
not really directly measurable or discernible. Thus, there were only two ways of
comparing two distinct pleasures (or pains): one was by making one pleasure or
pain a part or ingredient of another. Thus, Bentham argues, "The only certain
and universal means of making two lots of punishment perfectly
commensurable is by making the lesser an ingredient in the composition of the
greater. This may be done... [bly adding to the lesser punishment another
quantity of punishment...." JEREMY BENTHAM, 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM 92 (John Bowring ed., 1843). Note, though, that given the pain
duration experiments, see infra text accompying notes 36-38, even that will not
really suffice: adding new pain to a fixed pain may not actually make the whole
experience worse. (To the extent that people judge the misery of an experience
by averaging the peak misery and the misery at the endpoint, adding a mildly
bad experience to the end of a very bad experience may make it "seem-be?-
better than ending the bad experience entirely. Thus, patients may report less
pain when the colonoscopy instrument is left in at the end of an otherwise-
identical procedure even though the period in which it is left in is more
unpleasant than the same period would be if it were taken out). It is
transparent as well that this need not be true for conventional punishment-as
well as pain infliction. There is no a priori reason to believe that longer terms of
imprisonment are always hedonically worse than shorter ones, given a host of
social and psychological responses to distinct terms (e.g., adaptation to prison;
difficulty in reentering society; acceptance of more known hopeless situations
rather than anxiety-provoking hope). See Mitchell, supra.
Bentham's other suggestion, also anticipating preference utilitarianism, is to
measure each pleasure or pain by imagining that we are in a barter situation or
able to give each experience a money equivalent. Here is the relevant text, from
Halevy's translation of some of Bentham's unpublished manuscripts: "If off two
pleasures a man, knowing what they are, would as life enjoy the one as the
other, they must be reputed equal.. .If then between two pleasures the one
produced by the possession of money, the other not, a man had as life enjoy the
one as the other, such pleasures are to reputed equal. But the pleasure
produced by the possession of money is as the quantity of money that produces
it: money is therefore the measure of this pleasure... Money is the instrument
for measuring the quantity of pain or pleasure. Those who are not satisfied with
the accuracy of this instrument must find out some other that shall be more
accurate, or bid adieu to Politics and Morals." ELIE HALAEVY, 1 RADICALISME
PHILOSOPHIQUE 410, 412, 414 (Mitchell trans., 1918). Like more recent
preference utilitarians, including conventional economists, Bentham was aware
that using money to measure pain and pleasure was especially problematic for
those trying to do interpersonal comparisons because people with more money
would pay more to enjoy smaller pleasures and pay more to avoid smaller pains.
See Mitchell, supra.
Second, Mitchell argues that while Bentham may have professed to want to
develop a Newtonian measurement system, it is more apt to compare his
scientific efforts to Linnaeus than Newton: What Bentham ultimately does is to
list and categorize multiple sources of pleasure and pain, but he cannot
establish a system to calculate levels of either. Thus, Bentham notes (perhaps
2004] IS WELFARISM POSSIBLE?
relying on preference-satisfaction as a surrogate. His
affirmative claim-which will help me frame the core
arguments of this Part-is that happiness really is a
measurable entity, and that we have developed both good
subjective response technologies to measure a person's
happiness over time, free from the recall and reporting
distortions that have bedeviled "traditional hedonic"
research and good "objective" (physiological, non-report-
based, non-intentionally communicated) measures of
happiness as well. This "better" response-based non-
physiological measurement system would rely, first, on
measuring subjects' simple good/bad, approach/avoid,
persist/continue subjective reaction to large numbers of
randomly selected moments in the subjects' lives" rather
than relying on their global satisfaction ratings of wider
time periods and second, on monitoring certain involuntary
physiological manifestations of what we have come to label
as positive affect. For complex reasons I barely touch on,12 I
rightly) that a person will devalue a pain more when it is longer-lasting,
certain, or more pure, but in looking at any particular painful experience, this
sort of general classificatory knowledge will be of very little use in supplying a
cardinal utility scale for the experience. See Mitchell, supra.
11. The code name for this practice is "ecological momentary assessment."
For a good review essay, see Arthur A. Stone, Saul S. Shiffman & Marten W.
DeVries, Ecological Momentary Assessment, in WELL-BEING, FOUNDATIONS,
supra note 5, at 26. It is a fascinating question in my mind-a "history of
science" question that I do not feel I have the capacity to address in a serious
fashion-whether one can (at least partly) attribute the recent "principled"
theoretical attachment to this measurement mode to the invention of
technological devices that made it feasible. Obviously, the invention of highly
portable computers (like 'palm pilots') was a necessary condition to make the
research agenda realistic; the thornier question is whether the availability of a
new feasible measurement technology induces (to a significant extent) the
production of an intellectual framework in which the "new measurement toy" is
usable.
12. Basically, I think I believe that in order to use either the existing
physiological measures of happiness or any conceivable measures (including
ones that would depend on the direct observation of brain activity), we
ultimately must end up concluding that particular physical changes correlate
with properly-measured, self-reported hedonic states. (At core, there are two
reasons for this: first, the physiological measures might, at best, produce
ordinal measurements of whether the organism is more or less happy, but not
cardinal measures that could be summarized across time for the organism;
second, more conceptually and significantly, identifying that a particular brain
wave pattern, for instance, is the "happiness" pattern requires interpretation of
subjective data). As a result, the true barrier we face in measuring hedonic
states is ultimately grounded in the need to insure that self-reports are
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will focus on the subjective response technologies. There are
a host of practical barriers to implementing the long-term
program of the "new hedonic" psychologists, but I will not
focus on these either. 13
The interest in developing these techniques derives, at
core, from negative reactions both to the preference
utilitarianism that dominates modern economics on the one
meaningful because if we find that physical changes correlate with states that
are not themselves interpretable, we would have learned little of moment.
In the meantime though, there is a large cottage industry devoted to
measuring or observing physical shifts that are thought to correspond to
affective shifts. For instance, it appears possible that eye-blink rates (recorded
by implanting miniature electrodes to measure activity in the orbicularis oculi
muscle beneath the eye) are modulated by the affective valence of the
experimental subject: the startle response seems to be lowest when subjects are
(induced to be) "happiest" by being shown pleasant slides and highest when
subjects had been exposed to "negative" slides. See Scott R. Vrana, Ellen L.
Spence & Peter J. Lang, The Startle Probe Response: A New Measure of
Emotion?, 97 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 487 (1988). We may also measure levels of
cortisol secretions (generally measured from saliva samples); engage in Facial
Action Coding through observation or electromyography-both of which, push
comes to shove, are elaborate ways of quantifying how often we smile or furrow
our brows; measure changes in autonomic activity, most particularly
electrodermal activity; administer EEGs (and perhaps as cost goes down, PET
scans or MRIs) that index patterns of anterior asymmetries thought to
distinguish emotional states; use listeners or high-tech means to capture
emotional state through vocal patterns, more particularly measuring both the
level and changes in the level of what is known as fundamental frequency or
pitch, the rate at which vocal folds vibrate and measure as well as the speed
and intensity or loudness of speech. For a good review essay, see Randy J.
Larsen & Barbara L. Frederickson, Measurement Issues in Emotion Research,
in WELL-BEING, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 5, at 40. For discussions of the
currently prevalent notion that people are "happy" when there is more electrical
activity on the left, rather than right, hemisphere of the prefrontal cortex, see
Richard J. Davidson, Affective Style and Affective Disorders: Perspectives from
Affective Neuroscience, 12 COGNITION & EMOTION 307 (1998), and Andrew J.
Tomarken et al., Individual Differences in Anterior Brain Asymmetry and
Fundamental Dimensions of Emotion, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 676
(1992).
13. At core, the difficulty is that the techniques that the "new hedonics"
people think are most accurate are difficult (and expensive) to use for large
samples of people, yet we may often need to track happiness levels for such
large samples to draw meaningful policy conclusions. As a result, the initial
long-term "practical" goal of the new hedonic psychologists was to develop easily
and cheaply mass-administered instruments to which responses correlate
closely with the responses generated by what the researchers feel are the purer
and more accurate measurement technologies that cannot be used by large
numbers of subjects at a reasonable cost.
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hand and the "old hedonic psychology" that dominated
social psychology on the other.
It is not surprising that the "new hedonic psychologists"
intuited the basic philosophical problem that bedevils
preference utilitarianism: that preferences are only ex ante
judgments about the hedonic pay-off the subject expects to
derive from certain end states. But reflecting on the
cognitive and affective difficulties that would make our
predictions of the hedonic impact of different states of
affairs undependable-and obviously, psychologists are
prone to emphasize the degree to which assumptions of
context-independent, rational judgment are problematic-
makes it transparent that, in Kahneman's terms,"experienced" utility and both "predicted" and "decision"
utility may diverge. '
While I will not provide a fully detailed account of the
negative reaction that the new hedonic psychologists have
to the "old hedonic psychology," it is important to note a few
basic points. Essentially, the critical claims that the "new
hedonics" scholars emphasize are that the traditional
survey-based findings rely on respondents answering a
cognitively intractable question-how happy are you overall
over some fairly extended period? 1 -and that their
14. Kahneman puts it well: The weight that is assigned to the desirability of
an outcome in the context of a decision is called its decision utility. Decision
utilities are inferred from choices and are used to explain choices. Much of the
research on decision-making and on utility has been conducted in a rational and
behavioristic tradition, which focuses on observable choices and shuns
subjective notions such as experienced utility. It is implicitly assumed in this
tradition that the experienced utility of outcomes can be inferred from their
decision utility, because rational decision-makers surely know what they will
like. Kahneman, Objective Happiness, in WELL-BEING, FOUNDATIONS, supra note
5, at 17.
15. Typical questions are, "All things considered, how satisfied are you with
your life as a whole these days?" Respondents were asked to use a 1
(dissatisfied) to 10 (satisfied) scale. Ed Diener & Eunkook M. Suh, National
Differences in Subjective Well-Being, in WELL-BEING, FOUNDATIONS, supra note
5, at 435. See also Ronald Inglehart & Jacques-Rene Rabier, Aspirations Adopt
to Situations-But Why Are the Belgians so Much Happier than the French? A
Cross-Cultural Analysis of the Subjective Quality of Life, in RESEARCH ON THE
QUALITY OF LIFE 1, 7 (Frank M. Andrews ed., 1986) (questioning European
Community respondents: "On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied,
not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with your life?"); David G. Myers & Ed
Diener, The Pursuit of Happiness, 274 SCI. AM. 70, 71 (1996) (Survey questions
include: "Do you strongly disagree, disagree, slightly disagree, neither agree nor
disagree, slightly agree, agree or strongly agree: In most ways my life is close to
my ideal ... ").
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strategies to handle this intractable question reveal little
about their "actual happiness."" There are some good pre-
theoretical reasons to distrust the conventional findings.
Most particularly, critics of the conventional findings
maintain that we observe low test-retest reliability of
findings, results that are (unduly) sensitive to both short-
term contextual influences that would seem too trivial to
have a genuine impact on a stable sense of well-being, and
high sensitivity of reported happiness to the construction of
the survey instrument."
There are also good theoretical reasons to believe that
the critics' skepticism is justified. Not only is it useful to
consider this theory because it strongly bolsters the claim
that skepticism about the conventional findings is justified,
but, far more important for my ultimate purposes,
reflecting on the theory will help us confront for the first
time a number of vital questions to which I will need to
refer throughout the piece: what might it mean to "be"
happy, to "believe" oneself to be happy," to "misreport"
whether one is happy, or "not to recall" whether one has
16. This is the dominant theme in Norbert Schwarz & Fritz Strack, Reports
of Subjective Well-Being: Judgmental Processes and Their Methodological
Implications, in WELL-BEING, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 5, at 61. Kahneman
puts the point in a somewhat distinct way. In his view, traditional measures of
happiness privilege memory over experience and memory is fallible. "Memory-
based evaluations of experience and reports of current pleasure and pain are
treated with equal respect in routine conversations, but the respect for memory
is less deserved." Kahneman, Experienced Utility, supra note 5, at 676. "The
memory-based and the moment-based views draw on different intuitions about
what counts as real. There is an obvious sense in which present experience is
real and memories are not.... Because memories and stories of the past are all
we ultimately get to keep, memories and stories often appear to be all that
matters." Id. at 692.
17. Again, there is much more to the pre-theoretical debate that I do not
delve into here, but it is worth noting the following. Question order effects on
reported happiness are extreme: If one asks college students first, how happy
they are and second, how many dates they have had in the past month, the
correlation between the answers is but .12 but if one reverses the order of the
questions, the correlation rises to .66. See Fritz Strack, Leonard L. Martin &
Norbert Schwarz, Priming and Communication: Social Determinants of
Information Use in Judgments of Life Satisfaction, 18 EuR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL.
429 (1988). Moreover, events as trivial as finding a dime may alter (what ought
to be far less labile) feelings of well-being. See Norbert Schwarz et al., SOCCER,
RooMs, AND THE QUALITY OF YOUR LIFE: MOOD EFFECTS ON JUDGMENTS OF
SATISFACTION WITH LIFE IN GENERAL AND WITH SPECIFIC DOMAINS, 17 EuR. J.
Soc. PSYCHOL. 69 (1987).
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been happy. 8 The most trenchant theoretical key to
understanding the contention that the broad survey
questions about subjective well-being over substantial time
periods are inevitably unhelpful is that such questions are
cognitively intractable, so that those answering the
18. It might be helpful, in thinking about the distinction 
between
"mistaken" and "distinct" modes of reporting, to think about two discrete
problems in conventional hedonic survey reports. Experimental 
subjects are
often asked to report, first, when certain hedonically-charged 
life events
occurred, and second, how frequently such events occur; they are also 
asked the
sorts of questions (about overall life-satisfaction or happiness) that 
I mentioned
in the text. Answers to the first sorts of questions (dating events 
and noting
frequencies) can be unambiguously mistaken (e.g., I take it, for instance, 
that
events really occur on a particular date) and they frequently 
are: subjects
"telescope" events (reporting that they occurred more recently 
than they did)
and "estimate" rather than count the frequency of more commonplace 
events.
For good review discussions of these problems in survey research generally, 
see
Norbert Schwarz, Hans-J. Hippler & Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, 
Retrospective
Reports: The Impact of Response Formats, in AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY 
AND
THE VALIDITY OF RETROSPECTIVE REPORTS 187, 193 (Norbert Schwarz & Seymour
Sudman eds., 1994) [hereinafter AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY], and Norman 
M.
Bradburn, Janellen Huttenlocher & Larry Hedges, Telescoping and 
Temporal
Memory, in AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY, supra, at 204.
When, though, subjects "add up" or average their pain experiences 
in
distinct ways, or rate events with (relatively) happy endings as less 
stressful
than they would have rated them at the time, it is not nearly so clear 
that they
have made an "error" in reporting the "true" emotional valence/ongoing
significance of the event. When the reports are heavily influenced 
by what
seems like reporting artifacts-the manner in which responses are 
elicited, or
the date on which responses are elicited, we have reason to be wary 
of the
reports. (Thus, for instance, the fact that self-reports of the most recent 
week's
happiness level are unduly influenced by the affective valence 
of the most
recent events makes weekly reports inappropriately sensitive to 
the precise
moment at which the questionnaire is administered. See 
generally
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY, supra.
But when events occur in the subject's life that cause her to reconstrue 
more
permanently the meaning of the event, the fact that the event is not 
averaged in
to a lifetime summary of happiness as it was initially construed 
does not
constitute an obvious "error:" to believe that it does requires accepting 
what I
will argue in the text are two quite controversial assumptions. First, 
one must
believe that there are reasonable techniques of "summing" and 
"weighting"
momentary hedonic experiences (e.g., that they are fully commensurable) 
and,
second, and more important, that happiness is best thought of as 
the sum of
momentary affective experiences, with little weight put on (some 
variety or
other of) the hedonic status of an independent assessing "ego" judging 
both the
prospective and retrospective attractiveness of relatively broad 
life-states
(except to the degree that such assessments themselves provide 
momentary
affective pleasure or pain).
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questions must use simplifying strategies to come up with
an answer.19
There are a number of reasons for the intractability of
questions that require integration of sensory perceptions
over time, including perceptions of well-being. First, it is
difficult to retrieve information from an extended time
period. Though some relevant information is chronically
accessible, much is not. As a result, respondents' replies
may be grounded more in the availability of hedonically-
charged information than its actual significance to a more
informed and reflective subject. Survey respondents
generally make judgments based on information that is
accessible, generally because the relevant events are
recent,2 °  or the subject has been reminded of the
information, perhaps by a prior question (deliberately or
inadvertently included) on the same survey. 1
19. More generally, judgment tasks that require integration of sensory
perceptions over time may be relatively intractable. Kahneman argues that
most subjects could readily assess the brightness of an illuminated panel to
which they are exposed, but if asked to assess the total, or average, brightness
of the large number of panels they would have been exposed to in multiple
trials, they would have no good way of doing so, and would more typically base
their answer on the brightness of what they construed as some representative
panel. See Kahneman, Objective Happiness, in WELL-BEING, FOUNDATIONS,
supra note 5, at 3, 15. I am counterfactually assuming, in this piece, that
subjects inevitably report the results of their hedonic introspection accurately.
Obviously, though, the desire to present oneself in a socially acceptable fashion
may cause subjects to edit their responses.
20. Even when subjects were asked to fill out relatively short-term
assessments-to keep daily hedonic diaries-reports were unduly dominated by
events at the end of the day. Events that occurred in the first three hours of the
day had almost no impact on daily reports and end-of-day summaries were
dominated by events that occurred in the most recent three-hour period,
especially when reports were negative. See Stone et al., supra note 11, at 33.
21. For a general discussion of this phenomenon in survey response, see
E.Tory Higgins, Knowledge Activation: Accessibility, Applicability, and Salience,
in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: HANDBOOK OF BASIC PRINCIPLES (E.Tory Huggins and
Arie W. Kruglanski eds., 1996) [hereinafter SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY]. For a general
discussion of the fact that people typically stop searching for (inevitably hard-
to-retrieve) information as soon as they get enough to deal with a task they are
required to perform (like ascertaining one's hedonic state), see Galen V.
Bodenhausen & Robert S. Wyer, Social Cognition and Social Reality:
Information Acquisition and Use in the Laboratory and the Real World, in
SOCIAL INFORMATION PROCESSING AND SURVEYING METHODOLOGY 6 (Hans-J.
Hippler et al. eds., 1987).
The question order effects I mentioned, supra note 17, are generally
assumed to arise because researchers can shift the information that subjects
are most likely to retrieve by focusing attention on a certain sort of information
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Second, though less interestingly, questions about
global happiness asked in particular contexts are also
difficult for subjects to interpret, given the existence of
complex conversational norms that make it difficult for
subjects to be certain they understand the sub-text, as well
as text, of the questions they are asked to respond to. As a
result, surveyors may (deliberately or not) influence
whether the information that is retrieved is used or
discarded simply by shifting conversational norms. For
instance, given certain conversational norms about avoiding
redundancy, if a subject is asked to comment on how
satisfied he is with his marriage and then asked how happy
he is with life, he may think he is being asked to disregard
the impact that his marital satisfaction has on life
satisfaction. Research suggests that he is markedly more
prone to do so if the researcher does something as
seemingly minor as telling the respondent that he is about
to be asked two questions about his well-being.22
Third, and perhaps most interestingly, once information
(about hedonically-charged incidents, about a hedonically-
charged domain) is accessed and questions interpreted, the
information must still be framed-essentially, either as
representative of the subject's current state or as belonging
to some different state. If retrieved as representative of the
current state, positive information inflates judgment of
in a question that precedes the question on overall subjective well-being. Not
only will the subjects' view of overall happiness shift if asked to focus first on
happiness in a particular domain (like whether he or she has had many dates,
like marital satisfaction), but the importance of a particular domain can be
increased still more if it is the only specific domain the researcher highlights.
Thus, the correlation between marital satisfaction and life happiness-a
measure, in theory, that might suggest the salience of the domain in producing
happiness, though naturally happiness may cause marital satisfaction as well
as the other way around-is .32 when the marital satisfaction question is asked
after the life satisfaction question; it rises substantially (to .46) when questions
about marital satisfaction precede questions about life satisfaction, but such
questions are accompanied by questions about other domains (job and leisure),
and rises a good deal more still (to .67) when researchers ask only questions
about marital satisfaction before asking about life satisfaction. See Norbert
Schwarz, Fritz Strack & Hans-Peter Mai, Assimilation and Contrast Effects in
Part-Whole Question Sequences: A Conversational Logic Analysis, 55 PUB.
OPINION Q. 3 (1991).
22. When that lead in question is added, the correlation between life
satisfaction and marital satisfaction drops from .67 to .18. See Schwarz et al.,
supra note 21, at 11. Similarly, the observed correlation between dates in the
last month and life satisfaction drops back from .55 to .16. Id. at 5.
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well-being (in standard parlance, it is "assimilated"); if
thought to belong to some prior life, it will give rise to"contrast effects" (so that the retrieval of a good event will
make one's current situation look bad in contrast).2' Thus, if
respondents are asked to recall three recent events before
answering a question about global happiness, they are more
prone to report higher well-being levels if they recall
positive events than if they recall negative events, but if
asked to recall events that occurred more than five years
ago, they report higher happiness levels if they remember
negative events.24
The "new hedonics literature" assumes that all of these
sources of instability in research responses produce results
that are merely "unreliable," in the sense that the
respondents fail to report accurately on the presence or
absence of an actual emotional state.2 They are surely right
with respect to the first two of these sources of instability in
survey responses-the memory/access problem and the
conversational norm problem. I do not think the same can
be said of the third source of instability the new hedonic
23. The notion that information could either be assimilated in this way or
used to establish contrasts was first highlighted in Amos Tversky & Dale
Griffin, Endowment and Contrast in Judgments of Well-Being, in SUBJECTIVE
WELL-BEING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE 101 (Fritz Strack et al. eds.,
1991).
24. See Fritz Strack, Norbert Schwarz & Elisabeth Gschneidinger,
Happiness and Reminiscing: The Role of Time Perspective, Affect, and Mode of
Thinking, 49 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 1460, 1461 (1985).
Hedonically charged temporally distant memories may in some instances
give rise to assimilation, rather than contrast effects: thus, whether retrieved
incidents are recent or distant is a significant, but not determinative factor. It
appears to be the case that if people recall a memory in vivid detail, it will first
serve to alter their mood (e.g. a detailed recollection of a negative incident will
induce temporary bad mood) and that their subjective well-being reports will
then be mood congruent. For an experimental exploration of this complicating
phenomenon, see id., experiments 2 and 3. (Subjects who gave long and vivid,
rather than short, descriptions of negative events, as well as those who
described how an event occurred rather than why, reported lower subjective
well-being, while those who reported events in less emotionally involving
fashion-short descriptions or why descriptions-displayed the usual "contrast"
effect, e.g. the recollection of the distant negative event increased reported
subjective well-being). The finding is replicated in a somewhat different form in
Leslie F. Clark and James E. Collins, Remembering Old Flames: How the Past
Affects Assessment of the Present, 19 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 399
(1993).
25. For an excellent review essay, see Schwarz & Strack, supra note 16, at
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writers have identified (framing effects). 2' The reason for
this doubt goes to the central question I raise in this paper:
Framing effects produce pure noise only if there is some
objective state of subjective well-being apart from our
mental construal of it-apart from the stories we tell
ourselves about how happy we are. The new hedonics
literature has staked its project on the assumption that
there is some such objective state. In the version proffered
by Kahneman, it is simply the sum of an aptly cardinalized
measure of moments of instantaneous reactions to currently
perceived events. 7 If Kahneman's account is persuasive, of
course, these framing effects are, in essence, the root of
simple reporting errors because an event which has the
same "actual" hedonic valence (e.g., one hour of intense
physical pain) has a distinct impact on (reported) happiness
(though the same impact on the sum of lifetime momentary
pain) depending on whether it is assimilated (or used for
contrast) at the moment of report.28  If, however, our
26. The fourth effect I will discuss-comparison of the self with a social
reference group-is also at core a framing effect. See infra text accompanying
notes 32-35. The fifth--duration neglect-is the most complex: looked at, as
Kahneman does, as a product of memory deficit, it is a simple reporting error.
But I will discuss whether it is appropriate to view duration neglect entirely as
a reporting error, rather than a framed "construal" of event chunks.
27. This is most plainly true in his earlier writing, when he argued
"objective happiness" was an appropriate all-inclusive measure of welfare, but it
is even true to some degree given his more modest recent ambitions:
momentary measures are still designed to measure something that should be
described as an aspect of welfare.
28. Kahenman readily affirms the possibility that an ever-improving life-
one in which contrast effects always lead to higher reported current happiness-
is genuinely happier so long as the reason for that is that current-experiences
are actually more pleasurable when contrasted with past events. But the only
appropriate impact should be on current experience: past pains should not be
"cancelled out" in reporting (because relegated to a contrast construct) nor
should current experiences be reported as more pleasurable than they "actually
are" simply because one responds to the cognitively difficult task of assessing
actual hedonic state level by answering a simpler question, "am I better off now
than I was during some past period I have readily recalled?" Kahneman treats
the time path of experience as causing genuine hedonic changes (just as we will
see later that he accepts that someone who recalls past pain, even incorrectly,
might feel current pain merely from the recollection). See Kahenman,
Experienced Utility, supra note 5, at 20 ("Vithout a doubt, the traveler who goes
to a Kenya safari may continue to derive utility from that episode long after it
ends, whether directly-by 'consuming' the memories in pleasant or unpleasant
reminiscing-or, perhaps more importantly, by consuming the experience of the
self as it has been altered by the event. However, the moment-based approach
raises a question that should not be dismissed too lightly: How much time will
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"authentic" hedonic state is a function, in some significant
sense, of how we assess our lives on the whole, that
affective state is not adequately captured by momentary
responses to instantaneously perceptible activities: framing
may be said to affect not merely reported well-being, but an
integrated sense of well-being that is simply not readily
captured by summing momentary assessments.
This conceptual point may perhaps be made most
salient by considering that people may judge an event as
positive not only if it is better than "past" events to which it
is contrasted but if it is better than a readily-constructed
counterfactual to which it is contrasted. Of course, there are
situations in which this appears to lead to manipulable
misreporting of what are (probably) underlyingly stable
emotional states, grounded in surveyors' artifact, in just the
way that "new hedonics" critics assume: After all,
experimenters can (a) manipulate subjects' hedonic reports
by directing them to construct either upward (more
favorable than actual outcome) or downward (less
favorable) hypotheticals or (b) can manipulate their
tendencies to construct counterfactuals at all, knowing that
if they do construct them, they might be more prone to feel
regret over an outcome.29
be spent in such consumption of memories relative to the duration of the
original experience?"). Nonetheless, he generally seems to treat contrast and
assimilation (and peak/end mean reports of pain levels) as mere reporting
artifacts. See, e.g., id. at 675 ("It is immediately apparent from inspection of
Figure 37.1 that patient B had a worse experience than patient A... [though]
patient A in fact retained a worse evaluation of the procedure.").
29. See, in the first regard, Neal J. Roese, The Functional Basis of
Counterfactual Thinking, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 805 (1994)
(instructing participants first to record the details of a recent life event, then
induce them to consider either upward or downward counterfactual alternatives
to the event that they recorded; those induced to generate upward hypotheticals
reported more negative affect). In the second regard, see, e.g., Dale T. Miller &
Brian R. Taylor, Counterfactual Thought, Regret, and Superstition: How to
Avoid Kicking Yourself, in WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN 305, 310-12 (Neal. J. Roese
& James M. Olsen eds., 1995) (finding that experimental subjects playing
simulated computer blackjack game are far more prone to experience affectively
unpleasant regret when experimenters manipulatively make them believe that
either picking a card, or staying, are "actions" rather than omissions; they
believe they have taken action if they press "yes" when asked, "Do you want to
hit?" or "Do you want to stand?" and overestimate their losses when they have
taken action given the commonplace tendency to construct counterfactuals to
actions one has taken in relationship to single, short-term events).
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But what is one to make of the fact that even when
these same framing effects arise spontaneously in the
subject's life, they also appear to change reported subjective
well-being substantially? With regard to the framing effect
of hypothetical counterfactuals, consider the suggestive
finding that winners of Olympic bronze medals display
higher levels of happiness with their performance than
silver medallists." Presumably the reason for this is that
they imagine (as the relevant counterfactual) not winning a
medal at all, and feel they have done better than that, while
the second place finishers are disappointed because they
imagine that they might have won the first place gold. In
what sense might this represent a "reporting" error? In
what sense could one say that they did not at least believe
themselves happier? In what sense might we say that they
were not "authentically" happier?"'
Fourth, survey responses might well be problematic
because people may also judge their sense of well-being in
comparison with others. This is, of course, yet another
framing effect: just as a person may say she is happy
because recalling a long-past sad event only reminds her
that she is better off than that now, or may construe what
might generally be thought an intrinsically unpleasant
30. See Victoria H. Medvec, Scott F. Madey & Thomas Gilovich, When Less
Is More: Counterfactual Thinking and Satisfaction Among Olympic Medalists,
69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 603 (1995).
31. One way of thinking about the difficulty of resolving these questions
concerning the impact of the availability of alternative counterfactuals on
"happiness," that neatly foreshadows some of the difficulties that I will need to
confront (or at least advert to) as the paper proceeds is to note that: (1) It is very
unlikely that anyone would choose, ex ante, to win a bronze rather than silver
medal, even if informed of these survey results (so that under most conventional
suppositions about what it means to be prudent and informed, "preference-
satisfaction" and "experienced happiness" may well diverge); (2) It is only
modestly less unlikely that people who have won silver medals regret doing so,
ex post, even if informed that there is evidence that they might have been
"happier" if they had won a bronze instead (so that it is not unambiguous that
there exists some "reflective equilibrium" point at which "true judgments" about
hedonic states can readily be made); (3) Even if they "truly" believed that they
might well be "happier" in some sense if they finished third rather than second,
many people would believe that a "sense of accomplishment" or "pride" (even if
not reflected in happiness) might outweigh the "happiness" (not just in their
decision-making mode but in their retrospective evaluation of their life overall),
whether or not this sense of pride is ever experienced, at any moment, as
adequately hedonically pleasurable to outweigh the hypothesized hedonic loss
caused by the counterfactual contrast effect.
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event so that it inflates subjective well-being because it
appears better than constructed counterfactuals, so one
may report, or construe, events more or less favorably
depending upon whether one thinks they show that one is
better off or worse off than those around her. This fact
makes it possible, once more, for researchers to manipulate
answers to questions about well-being by manipulating how
subjects construct relevant comparison groups." For
example, simply by implying norms of behavior in research
instruments, people can be made to report higher levels of
satisfaction or dissatisfaction with particular behavioral
realms or their lives more generally.' Once more, though,
32. For a good review of the literature on the degree to which both
experimenters and "naturally existing conditions" may establish comparison
norms, see Dale T. Miller & Deborah A. Prentice, The Construction of Norms
and Standards, in SOCIAL Psychology, supra note 21, at 799.
Even though experimental subjects are presumably perfectly familiar with
social standards for attractiveness, exposing research participants to
photographs of highly attractive women depresses women's self-assessments of
their own physical attractiveness and men's satisfaction with the attractiveness
of their romantic partners. See Thomas F. Cash, Diane Walker Cash &
Jonathan W. Butters, "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall... ?": Contrast Effects in Self-
Evaluation of Physical Attractiveness, 9 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
351 (1983); Doublas T. Kendrick & Sara E. Gutierres, Contrast Effects and
Judgments of Physical Attractiveness: When Beauty Becomes a Problem, 38 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 131 (1980). Experimenters can increase reported
subjective well-being simply by insuring the presence of a physically disabled
confederate in the presence of those asked to respond to questions about well-
being. See Fritz Strack et al., The Salience of Comparison Standards and the
Activation of Social Norms: Consequences for Judgements of Happiness and
Their Communication, 29 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 303 (1990).
33. See, e.g., Norbert Schwarz & Bettina Scheuring, Judgments of
Relationship Satisfaction: Inter- and Intraindividual Comparisons as a
Function of Questionnaire Structure, 18 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 485, 488-89
(1988) (indicating that couples express lower levels of satisfaction with their sex
lives if experimenters change the categorical boxes one can check for how often
in a given time period they have sex so that the lowest frequency box one can
check contains a larger number of sexual contacts in a given time period, as
does the next lowest etc. because the subjects will believe they have less sexual
contact than is typical if they are in the lower categories). See also Norbert
Schwarz et al., Response Categories: Effects on Behavioral Reports and
Comparative Judgments, 49 PUB. OPINION Q. 388 (1985) (finding that if
respondents are asked to judge how satisfied they are with their leisure time
activities, they will judge themselves to be more satisfied if given a
questionnaire that elicits information about how much TV they watch each day
where the lower range categories encompass a much larger amount of TV
watching than when they are asked the question alongside a question about TV
watching in which the lowest categorical amount of TV watching one can do
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life itself creates the same framing effect spontaneously, in
ways that may have persistent, rather than readily
mutable, impact on reported subjective well-being. For
example, students at a given level of performance have
higher levels of self-esteem at low-quality schools' and
citizens in more egalitarian communities report higher
levels of well-being than those with the same income in less
egalitarian settings.' 5 Are we prepared to say that the
"happier" citizens of more egalitarian communities are
simply mis-reporting some more authentic, lower happiness
levels? Can we say this even though these reports may not
be so mutable that it seems reasonable to dismiss them as
unreliable indicators of a persistent mental state we might
care about?
Fifth, and again, quite significantly, new hedonic
researchers note that existing reports are unreliable
because subjects do not construct accounts of their well-
being by summing the hedonic valence of all their
experiences, but rather seem to think about accessible
incidents that they treat as representative; thus, they
typically neglect the duration of the pain and joy they have
experienced. In judging how painful an event is, subjects'
includes a far smaller amount per day since in the first condition, they will not
believe they watch more TV than the average person).
34. See, e.g., Herbert W. Marsh & John W. Parker, Determinants of Student
Self-Concept: Is It Better To Be a Relatively Large Fish in a Small Pond Even If
You Don't Learn to Swim as Well?, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 213
(1984); Jerald G. Bachman & Patrick M. O'Malley, Self-concepts, Self-Esteem,
and Educational Experience: The Frog Pond Revisited (Again), 50 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 35 (1986). Note, though, that the enhanced self-
esteem may be (at least in significant part) a function of how peers and teachers
treat the relatively rarer successful students in poorer schools rather than a
social comparison judgment.
35. See David Morawecz, Income Distribution and Self-Rated Happiness:
Some Empirical Evidence, 87 ECON. J. 511 (1977).
36. For whatever it is worth, we seem to share this trait with rats; the little
critters' level of aversion to a blinking light that has been paired with an
electric shock that has been administered to them vary with the intensity or
magnitude of the shock but not its duration. See O.H. Mowrer & L.N. Solomon,
Contiguity vs. Drive-Reduction in Conditioned Fear: The Proximity and
Abruptness of Drive Reduction, 67 AM. J. PSYCHOL. 15 (1954). Similarly, when
scientists with more respect for rats' welfare (but equally little for their
autonomy) administer pleasurable stimulation to the pleasure centers of rats'
brains, the rats react only to the intensity of the stimulation, not its duration,
in seeking out the stimulus. See Peter Shizgal, On the Neural Computation of
Utility: Implications from Studies of Brain Stimulation Reward, in WELL-
BEING, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 5, at 500, 508-09. See also Terence A. Mark &
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typical global retrospective evaluation conforms to what is
called the Peak-End rule: they report the quality of the
event as the arithmetic mean of the (presumably accessible)
most painful moment and the (also easily recalled) final
moment.Thus, in evaluating how bad a particular medical
procedure (colonoscopy) is, subjects will simply average the
last pain they felt and the worst pain they felt. Thus,
assume that Patient A experiences a peak pain of 8 (on a 10
point scale) and pain at the thirty minute mark of the
procedure of 4, at which time the procedure ends, the
instrument is removed and pain drops to 0. He will report a
pain level of 6 for the procedure. Patient B has the same
procedure as Patient A, and experiences the same level of
pain at each moment, except that instead of removing the
medical instrument at the half hour mark, it is left in for an
additional fifteen minutes, producing a pain level of 2
(during a time, of course, at which A's pain level was 0). B
will not only report a less painful procedure (a pain rating
of 5, the mean of the peak of 8 and the end-point of 2), but
will be more prone to choose to repeat the procedure when
it is next medically indicated, even though he had
experienced (on a moment-by-moment basis) just as much
pain as A for a half hour and more pain than A experienced
for the next 15 minutes. Duration neglect is, under certain
C.R. Gallistel, Subjective Reward Magnitude of Medial Forebrain Stimulation
as a Function of Train Duration and Pulse Frequency, 107 BEHAV.
NEUROSCIENCE 389 (1993) (reporting that rats seek out activities that trigger
pleasurable brain stimulation without regard to the reward's duration, so long
as it exceeds one second). I am not certain how to evaluate these findings. It is
certainly possible that they compromise the claim I will ultimately make that it
is possible to see the peak/end "rule" as a form of meaning-giving activity, since
it is unlikely that rats engage in "meaning-giving."
37. See Donald A. Redelmeier & Daniel Kahneman, Patients' Memories of
Painful Medical Treatments: Real Time and Retrospective Evaluations of Two
Minimally Invasive Procedures, 66 PAMN 3 (1996). In a quite parallel
experiment, subjects who immerse their hand in an unpleasantly cold (14
degrees Celsius) tub of water for sixty seconds report less pain if they then
immerse their hand for an additional 30 second period in slightly warmer, but
still aversively cold, (15 degree) water than if they remove their hand from the
cold water at the end of the sixty second period. Their choices map up to their
retrospective evaluation, as well. Sixty-five percent of participants choose to
repeat the longer rather than the shorter trial. See Daniel Kahenman et al.,
When More Pain is Preferred to Less: Adding a Better End, 4 PSYCHOL. SCI. 401
(1993). For similar findings about duration neglect, see Carol Varcy & Daniel
Kahneman, Experiences Extended Over Time: Evaluation of Moments and
[Vol. 52
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conceptions, a simple reporting error; instead of accurately
assessing one's actual hedonic state, one reports only that
which one remembers most readily."
B. The Critique of Hedonic Utilitarianism
1. Introducing the Essential Problems:
Commensurability, Scaling, and Unacknowledged
Perfectionism. There are several issues raised in designing
a hedonimeter. First, there is a practical problem: a
hedonimeter can perfectly capture subjective well-being
only if there is a single, scaled positive hedonic state (and a
single, scaled negative one). That requires that all relevant
positive (negative) emotions are fully commensurate with
one another 39 and that there are satisfactory ways to
Episodes, 5 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 169, 177-80 (1992); Barbara L.
Fredrickson & Daniel Kahneman, Duration Neglect in Retrospective
Evaluations of Affective Episodes, 65 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 45 (1993).
38. I will discuss duration neglect at some length, see infra text
accompanying notes 61-78, because I think it poses the most plausible (but still
not fully convincing) exemplar for the "new hedonics" argument that reports
about the hedonic quality of extended periods are less "accurate" than reports
that sum moment-by-moment evaluations.
39. It is worth noting a very significant point here that Dick Craswell made
in thinking about problems of commensurability generally: when looking at
individuals, economists may duck the commensurability question by noting that
individuals can make choices among option-sets, even when they believe in
some way that the choices are not strongly commensurable. To track the terms I
have been using, preference-utilitarians can largely duck the commensurability
issue, simply by arguing that all options are commensurate (capable of
meaningful comparison) in at least the sense that one can be preferred to
another. (Naturally, this option is not available to hedonic utilitarians). But
Craswell emphasizes that if we need to construct a social welfare function-
requiring some capacity to weigh and measure how different people evaluate
end states, incommensurability becomes a bigger problem. The reason in this
regard, of course, is that there is no simple social summing/voting mechanism
that resembles the choice of an individual. Thus, an individual may choose to
sacrifice friendship and community for pay and we may think, as preference
utilitarians, that is enough to endorse making material acquisition the
normative end-state for her,' even if she does not believe the choices are truly
fully commensurable. But if we adopt a social policy that increases wealth for
some while destroying old friendship and community bonds, for others, the fact
that we do not have a common metric to deal with these gains and losses might
be considerably more problematic because preference-summing techniques are
inevitably controversial and hedonic utilitarian measures require direct
commensurability and additivity. See Richard Craswell, Incommensurability,
Welfare Economics, and the Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1419, 1447-50 (1998).
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measure (in a fashion that permits summing, through
explicit cardinalization or some technique for transforming
ordinal rankings into a "welfare fimction7) how positive or
negative any particular hedonically-charged state is.4
At the same time, the basic conceptual disquiet with
direct hedonic utilitarianism is easy enough to explain.
There is no reason to believe that people do (or should)
value any particular concrete end-state. If we give any
meaningful content to "pleasure" or "pain," then there is no
reason to assume that a rational agent should maximize net
pleasure, rather than a host of alternative emotional end-
states. People might rationally choose instead to max mize
the degree to which others admire them, the degree to
which they meet perceived duties, the degree to which they
recall events in their life vividly (even if the events are all
vividly unpleasant). Now, it is possible to say that anything
people choose to seek should be defined as pleasurable (so
that we avoid the seeming narrowness and implicit
40. I should make reference in this regard to the two most mainstream
techniques for deriving "cardinalized" utility judgments from ordinal pair-wise
comparisons: one involves the observation of probabilistic choices and the other
involves successions of pair-wise choices in which one member of the pair is
more plainly cardinaL Thus, one possible way to say that we value experience X
at least twice as much as experience Y is to say that we would choose a 50%
chance of X over a 100% chance of Y. (And we could "perfect" our cardinal
measurement scheme by noting, for instance, that we would choose certain Y
over a 33% chance of X). We might also argue that we value X twice as much as
Y if we are willing to work twice as many hours to get it (at least if we assumed
the disutility of work was related to its duration in a linear fashion). For a good
discussion of these standard methods, see Gm1FIN, supra note 2, at 101 (1986).
41. I suspect that those interested in exploring the full range of the ultimate
policy-relevance of hedonic psychology must also at some point attend to the
question of whether we can properly measure any given hedonic state, even
assuming there are a range of such states that are impossible to compare with
one another. And, of course, one must then deal with a significant ancillary
issue: assuming one could solve the measurement problem for a single state,
would good information about that particular state contribute to policy
discourse? Here is a useful mini-hypothetical, though, that might clarify what
the concern is in this regard. We may believe that in designing a state policy or
set of-formalized or informal--professional norms about pain medication
administration, it would help us to know just how much purely physical pain
people felt at certain points of time. We might want to know this information
even if we thought the measures of such pain were in significant ways
incommensurable with other relevant hedonic information (including hedonic
information that is transparently relevant when thinking about pain-reduction
treatments): how do we add up pain and awareness, pain and loss of control,
pain and shorter life?
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perfectionism of a welfarism that is, at its deep core, plainly
designed to put few constraints on the sway of individual
choice), but if we simply define the things people seek as
the things that give them pleasure, we seemingly might as
well move away from direct hedonic utilitarian thought,
with its implicit psychology of motivation.42 In this sense,
preference utilitarians cannot be satisfied that the new
hedonic psychologists do not explicitly extol any particular
sensations (like "pleasure" or "pain") in the fashion that
conventional hedonic utilitarians may have,63 but merely
report on whether a person responds "favorably" to his
situation. There is no rate of such "favorable response" that
is unambiguously optimal for all subjects.
I make observations on the intersection between this
conceptual problem and the first practical requirement in
hedonimeter design in both subsections (b) and (c). There, I
will explore the implausibility of the necessary assumptions
that there either be a single end state to which we aspire or
a set of easily commensurable end states. I then return, in
(d), to one effort to defend the proposition that at core,"positive" and "negative" affect have a single meaning,
dictated by the purported (single, simple) biological
functions of each. I will largely ignore the very difficult
issues of scaling raised by the second practical
requirement.44
42. Perhaps surprisingly, making this move may not take us all the way to
preference utilitarianism because a true preference utilitarian must account for
the meta-taste to meet, or not meet, one's discrete preferences. See infra text
accompanying note 46.
43. To the degree that the new hedonic psychologists ultimately look to
measure happiness by measuring physical states directly, rather than reporting
intentionally communicated information, see supra text accompanying note 12,
then the accusation that they are subject to the critique that hedonic
utilitarianism is inadequately subjective obviously gains even greater force. The
physical measures really are quite plainly either particular sensations or
proxies for such sensations.
44. I do want to note a few points relevant to the possibility of scaling that I
hope I (or others interested in exploring the relevance of hedonic psychology to
political theory and law) must eventually explore at greater length. First, there
is an important and (possibly) counterintuitive finding to report, lying at the
border of the scaling issue and a huge issue to which I return soon, whether the
degree to which we are happy is always best judged from the perspective of an
integrated Ego judging her life rather than the perspective of a third party
attempting to integrate momentary experiences in a fundamentally
mathematical way. If one takes the global survey (how happy are you?)
questions at all seriously, it would be interesting to find out (as researchers
2004]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52
2. Commensurability of End States or the Selection of a
Single State. Many of the neo-utilitarian philosophers'
attacks on Bentham's "direct" hedonic utilitarianism
focused on the observation that there was no reason to
believe that people should seek or value any single end-
state, nor should one believe, as Bentham did, that as a
matter of description, the single-minded pursuit of
(something we might label) pleasure (or the "excess" of
pleasure over pain) in fact motivated actors.45 It is not even
inevitably or logically the case that we seek a single end if
have) that the intensity of positive experiences does not predict overall
happiness, what matters is the sheer number of good experiences. (This implies,
in some versions, that we should not scale distinct good experiences at all if we
were attempting to measure hedonic states over time-which seems worse than
counterintuitive-or, even more counter-intuitively, that we should scale but
count seemingly hyper-pleasurable experiences as less valuable than milder
positive experiences). See, e.g., Ed Diener, Ed Sandvik & William Pavot,
Happiness is the Frequency, Not the Intensity, of Positive versus Negative Affect,
in SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE, supra 23, at
119 (suggesting some plausible explanations of why it might be true that hyper-
pleasurable experiences are counter-hedonic: for instance, really good
experiences give rise to unfortunate contrast effects thereafter that mildly
pleasurable ones might not: hence, the possible implication that we should
assign a lower positive number to very pleasurable experiences).
My point, though, is not whether the finding is right; it is that it is plausible
and that its plausibility makes it hard to imagine what sort of summing scheme
we could use for pleasurable and unpleasant moments. The amount of money
you have accumulated over time is transparently the sum of what you have
taken in minus what you have expended and given away-imagine thinking
someone is richer than his neighbor simply because he has been paid more often
and gone to the store to shop less frequently. It is not so clear that the amount
of happiness in your life is in some parallel way the sum of the amount of
happiness you have experienced.
45. At core, "preference utilitarianism'-the dominant form of modem
utilitarianism-is grounded to a significant extent in the view that rational
beings need not endorse Bentham's notion that the avoidance of pain and the
pursuit of pleasure were their proper despotic masters. See, e.g., John C.
Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior, in UTILITARIANISM AND
BEYOND 39 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982). Harsanyi states:
[HI edonistic ... utilitarianism.., presupposes a now completely
outdated hedonistic psychology. It is by no means obvious that all we
do we do only in order to attain pleasure and avoid pain.... Even if I
want to accomplish something for myself, it is by no means self-evident
that my main purpose is to produce some feelings of pleasure in myself,
and it is not the accomplishment of some objective condition, such as
having a good job, solving a problem, or winning a game etc....
[Tihere is no reason why any theory of morality should try to prejudge
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we decide to define that end as inclusively (and near-
tautologically) as possible (e.g., we seek the satisfaction of
our desires, whatever they may be). We might, for example,
have the meta-desire not to have each desire satisfied, so
that it would be wrong to argue that our goal was the
satisfaction of each of our desires. Thus, a true preference
utilitarian might note that while subject S ordinarily
sought some list of positive end states A, B, C .... Z, and
preferred each to some ordinal-pair list of not-A, not-B....
not-Z, he still did not prefer to have all his desires met. The
true preference utilitarian notes not just that A may not be"more pleasurable" (in any narrow sense of what the word
"pleasurable" might mean) than not-A, but that the subject
need not choose to maximize the occurrence of favorable
experiences, at all, however he defines favorable
experiences.
For instance, many of us might think that being
drugged into a constant state of satisfied euphoria was a
bad outcome (implying we value something like "self-
actualization" or "control" as well as experienced
pleasure),4" even if we genuinely thought the drug did
the issue whether people are always after pleasure or whether they
also have other objectives.
Id. at 54.
46. For a fuller argument to this effect, see Anthony Kenny, Happiness, in
LXVI PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 93, 95. Kenny notes that this
meta-desire is no more problematic or internally contradictory than the belief
that not all of our beliefs are true (though we neither know which beliefs to
discard nor which desires should go unsatisfied). "Modesty seems to demand
that... we should believe that some of our beliefs are false.... Similarly,
patience seems to demand.. .that we should be willing that some of our desires
should be dissatisfied." Id. at 95.
47. The question of whether we value the pursuit of a chosen life plan
matters a good deal even when we are not evaluating the lives of those drugged
into a passive state of bliss; it matters when we try to understand conventional
welfare economics propositions. For a standard statement of the view that we
need to look at the process by which we attain "happy end states," see Amartya
Sen, Capability and Well-Being, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 30, 39 (Martha C.
Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993). Sen states:
[Fireedom may have intrinsic importance for the person's well-being
achievement.. .not just because more freedom may make better
alternatives available. This view is contrary to the one typically
assumed in standard consumer theory, in which the contribution of a
set of feasible choices is judged exclusively by the value of the best
element available. Even the removal of all the elements of a feasible
set.. .other than the chosen best element is seen, in that theory, as no
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induce "pleasure."8 We may also think it is of little or no
consequence if we discover that we have been "happy"
because we have lived under such rigidly oppressive
circumstances that we have had few wishes or aspirations
(implying that we value the development of challenging
aspirations as well as satisfaction).49 Those who have strong
senses of duty may lead just the life they have sought
without attending at all to their own pleasure and pain
real loss, since the freedom to choose does not, in this view, matter in
itself.
Id. at 39. From the vantage point of more conventionally utilitarian economists,
the value of "freedom" (e.g. of larger option sets) is simply a function of our
uncertainty about our future preferences. For the standard economic
formulation, see David M. Kreps, A Representation Theorem for 'Preference for
Flexibility,' 47 ECONOMETRICA 565 (1979).
I suspect that the best hedonic welfarists' response to the 'freedom' issue
might go something like this: presumably, freedom has no intrinsic meaning, it
is simply a contingent empirical question whether people like it (for Benthamite
direct utilitarians) or choose it (for Hare's preference utilitarians). Surely, it is
possible that Agent A would prefer the state, "I chose X over Y from the option
set IX,Y}" to the state, "I was given X" and it is also possible that the process of
choosing makes him giddy (in the properly reported subjective well-being or the
startle probe sense); but it seems plausible as well that he would choose not to
make choices or that the choice-making process leads to anxiety, declining self-
reported subjective well-being, and all the bad physiological signs. At that
point, it strikes me that when Sen speaks of freedom's "intrinsic importance,"
he either has a non-welfarist, perfectionist view of freedom-you should want it
whether you want it or not-or, more weakly, that he claims that, at least when
you do not overtly devalue it, the way in which you like it is not especially
commensurate with the gains from the consumption of X. I think it is the
second point he is really trying to make, but I am not really sure that reading is
persuasive. See Sen, Capability and Well-Being, supra.
48. This is one conventional reading of the message of anti-Utopian works.
See generally ALDOuS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1991).
49. For more in-depth discussions see generally PARTHA DASGUPTA, AN
INQUIRY INTO WELL-BEING AND DESTITUTION (1993); Amartya Sen, Capability
and Well-Being, supra note 46. There are two distinct perfectionist reactions to
this sort of observation. In the one (more subject-focused) variant that is my
main focus, we discount momentary reports of happiness because we believe the
subject herself devalues this sort of happiness and would in some sense "enjoy"
another. In another view, the third party observer disclaims interest in
aspiration-impoverished happiness, believing that even if the subject never
experiences any discontent with her life-state, she has still not lived as good or
fulfilled a life as she would have had she had more opportunities to develop
higher aspirations. This second view is more associated with the view that
subjective welfarism is too thin a theory to motivate all social and political
action, rather than a theory associated with the view that it is incoherent.
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(e.g., religious martyrs, children raised to attend to the
needs of their parents).5
The basic conceptual problem with the simplest form of
hedonism is that it is not, when pressed, really a subjective
welfarist theory at all."' If a hedonist assumes there is some
particular set of sensations that everyone should seek, he is
overriding the authority of the subject to determine
whether those sensations are really most significant to
him.52 And even if the hedonist backs off and says that the
sensations that make people "happiest" are, by definitional
fiat, those that they most "enjoy" (thereby trying to blur the
line between hedonic and preference utilitarianism), he is
still subject to the challenge that he could not readily
explain why some value only veridical or authentic, rather
than illusory, experiences that could generate the same
sensations. The choice is sensible only for those with some
meta-desire that does not value just sensations themselves,
but also conditions that do not have a sensory expression.
Thus, some people may prefer actual over illusory
experiences because they have the meta-desire to engage
their active (doing) faculties53 or may have the meta-desire
not to engage in self-delusion more generally in evaluating
how their lives have gone.
Second, the category of "pleasures" surely includes a
wide variety of sensations that are conceptually difficult to
compare. A careful reading of the hedonic psychology
literature bolsters this philosophical observation
substantially. How do we compare (on any single scale)
satisfactions gained from (what some might term) "comfort"
50. For a good discussion of why one cannot profitably argue that anything
that people in fact seek describes what makes them happy, see Kenny, supra
note 46, at 99.
51. For an excellent discussion of this conceptual point, see Sumner, supra
note 3, at 92-98.
52. Thus, for instance, there is no reason to believe that people should even
uniformly be averse to pain. A wounded soldier on a battlefield might well revel
in feeling pain both because it reveals to him that he has survived the wound
and because pain is a harbinger of discharge from the front. See id. at 102. At a
minimum, it would appear necessary to note that people seek to avoid the
suffering that usually (but not invariably) accompanies pain rather than pain
itself. This distinction between pain and suffering is explored in some detail in
Eric J. Cassell, The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine, 306 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 639 (1982).
53. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 49 (1974); ROBERT
NOZICK, THE EXAMINED LIFE: PHILOSOPHICAL MEDITATIONS 104-08 (1989).
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to those gained from (what some might dub) excitement or"pleasure?" How do we judge the satisfactions that
accompany the mild frustration of sorting through
something puzzling or new? An increase in comfort may be
good, but if it is accompanied by a decrease in "pleasure" it
is unclear whether we have witnessed an improvement or
decline in a meaningful welfare level. We may (arguably) be
able to measure each, but not have any good idea what to
ask people to tell us about the "balance. 54
54. This contrast dominates Scitovsky's well-known social/psychological
theory of the growing discontent in American culture. See TIBOR SCITOVSKY, THE
JOYLESS ECONOMY (1976). My point here is not to argue that Scitovsky's
argument is right, but simply to note that he raises a not-readily-refuted
argument: we may readily describe two unambiguously positive hedonic states
(in his case comfort and pleasure) whose simultaneous attainment may not be
possible, and whose "relative value" is not readily commensurable. Id. at 59-79.
One can tell, in other words, that one is comfortable (or stimulated) but there is
no apparent psychological mechanism to balance achievement of each end state.
Scitovsky argues in the book that people essentially require two quite
distinct forms of "goods-those that satisfy basic physiological needs that cause
unpleasant levels of arousal (needs, e.g. for food, drink, sex) that can indeed be
satiated (giving rise to "comfort") and those required to alleviate boredom
(creating pleasure), through optimal novelty and stimulation. In his view,
feelings of comfort and discomfort (related to the level of arousal) are not
commensurate with feelings of pleasure (a function of changes in arousal level).
See id. at 61. He argues, moreover, that positive and negative experiences are
not on the same scale, to be balanced against one another, but refer to wholly
different sorts of experiences, but I want to leave that form of
incommensurability aside. Id. Pleasure achieved as a by-product of need
reduction is fleeting, though; since it lasts only so long as the change from
discomfort to comfort lasts; seeking pleasure through need reduction, then,
rather than through stimulation is a no-win hedonic strategy. Id. at 62.
Scitovsky argues that people tend to choose comfort (the reduction of
unpleasant arousal) over stimulation, in part because advanced economies are
so readily able to meet demands for comfort, see id. at 10, and in part because
(1) we are instantly rewarded when we satisfy demands for comfort, while the
impact of doing so on long-term pleasure is revealed to us only gradually and
people tend to respond to instant, rather than complex long-term reinforcement,
and (2) the process of satisfying a need is pleasurable and we tend to want to
repeat the process of eliminating a want, though as we reduce wants we are less
able to do so. See id. at 66, 71-77 ("[Tlhe satisfaction of a need gives both
pleasure and comfort. But the continuous maintenance of comfort would
eliminate pleasure, because, with arousal continuously at its optimal level,
there can be no change in arousal towards the optimum."). Moreover, the choice
is poor in a host of ways meeting demands for comfort is more resource
intensive and thus environmentally problematic, more prone to be met by mass
production/consumption which depletes the capacity to experience novelty,
raises the (relative) price of novel goods and experiences, generates fewer
positive consumption externalities than "stimulating" consumption, and
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Similarly, psychologists who study the functions of
affective states often sharply differentiate positive and
negative states that others might treat as unified. A
substantial number of emotions researchers would argue
that one's mood can be good (or bad) though one is unhappy
(or happy) because "mood" (unlike emotions like
"happiness") is dominantly a function of the individual's
sense that his resources are adequate to meet his current
demands while emotions (arguably) represent more
momentary responses to hedonically relevant present
events. (Thus, in good moods, most goals seem attainable
and people are likely to engage in goal-directed behavior; in
bad moods they become self-focused and passive)." Once
more, whether improvements in mood are commensurable
with improvements in (more momentary) emotion is hardly
obvious.
degrades what might otherwise be stimulating work. See id. at x-xi, 86, 142,
144, 207, 248-63.
55. For a good review essay summarizing the position that moods and
emotions are quite distinct, see Nico H. Frijda, Varieties of Affect: Emotions and
Episodes, Moods, and Sentiments, in THE NATURE OF EMOTION: FUNDAMENTAL
QUESTIONS 59 (Paul Eckman & Richard J. Davidson eds., 1994). The position
that moods and emotions are distinct is reasonably widespread. See, e.g.,
Richard J. Davidson, On Emotion, Mood, and Related Affective Constructs, in
THE NATURE OF EMOTION 51 (Paul Eckman & Richard J. Davidson eds., 1994);
C.Daniel Batson, Laura L. Shaw & Kathryn C. Oleson, Differentiating Affect,
Mood, and Emotion: Toward Functionally Based Conceptual Distinctions, 13
REV. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 294 (1992); William N. Morris, A Functional
Analysis of the Role of Mood in Affective Systems, 13 REV. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 256 (1992). Others, though, regard mood as simply an attenuated,
diffuse and mild form of emotion. See, e.g., Constantine Sedikides, Central and
Peripheral Self-Conceptions are Differentially Influenced by Mood: Tests of the
Differential Sensitivity Hypothesis, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 759
(1995), Joseph P. Forga, Mood and Judgment: The Affect Infusion Model (AIM),
117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 39 (1995).
56. To some extent, of course, too, the question of whether people generally
in good moods are "better off" than those who have accumulated more positive
states depends in significant part on a (weak) theory of human flourishing.
Those who believe that mastery and sense of control are key human attributes
are arguably more likely to value mood compared to pleasure, which can
somewhat more typically be achieved more passively. On the other hand, one
can readily imagine a group of observers who devalue good mood because it
(arguably) leads to the repressive denial of negative affect, and such observers
might (conceivably) believe that self-delusive "happiness" is less valuable than
happiness that survives reflection.
I return later to the controversial psychological literature on what is
conventionally dubbed "depressive realism"-the tendency for depressives to be
less deluded about a variety of circumstances and prospects in their lives (most
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
In much the same way, we might believe that so-called"pleasures of the mind" are indeed profoundly
incommensurate with "pleasures of the body,"
notwithstanding the legitimate suspicion that such
distinctions are just brain-workers' elitist yammering.57 In
one view, people have domain-specific responses of
attraction to stimuli. Typically, according to proponents of
this view, the main sources of bodily pleasures are our
sheath of skin and the entrance and exit holes in our
bodies: bodily pleasures may be tonic (time extended)
pleasures from specific stimuli (caresses, flowery aromas,
sweet foods) or relief pleasures (like sneezing). The relief
pleasures involve almost no cognitive or meaning-giving
activity while the tonic pleasures are both direct and
meaning-mediated (though still distinct from the pleasures
classed as "pleasures of the mind" in ways I am about to
describe).
Pleasures of the mind, though, are distinct both in
terms of their manifestations, uniqueness to humans,
duration, level of volition associated with them, and
fundamental origin. Thus, they are not inexorably
accompanied by a distinct physiological response (including
a distinctive universal signal such as a facial expression);
they are far less likely to be present in all primates; and
they are typically time-extended; their occurrence is more
typically deliberately sought out. More profoundly, the"emotional" sequence that precedes these pleasures is
typically complex in ways that even tonic body pleasures
are not (in that it is not so obviously a sequence of
unambiguously positive events). Pleasures of the mind
seem to occur when expectations are violated, causing
autonomic nervous system arousal (an unpleasant anxiety
notably their level of control over random or chance events) and (most
particularly negative) judgments others make of them. I will do so in discussing
why hedonic psychologists might distrust the widespread claim by "preference
utilitarians" that we can trust that fuller information will permit us to reach
more truly satisfactory states. For now, though, I just wanted to note the
possibility that some might discount the importance of "good moods" because
they lead to (or at least seem to be associated with) self-deception. (Assuming
the two are correlated, it is plausible that good moods cause us to become
unrealistic; it is also possible that one can only be happy if one represses lots of
information, especially about our fundamental helplessness and inability to
influence critical aspects of our environment).
57. For a review essay expounding this position, see Michael Kubony, On
the Pleasures of the Mind, in WELL-BEING, supra note 2, at 134.
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state), followed by a search for interpretation that
culminates in arousal reduction. In one view, the classic
pleasure of the mind arises from the sequence of emotions
(perhaps a high, but not too-high peak of arousal followed
by a satisfactory ending). 8
Thus, in this view, what gives rise to intense enjoyment
of music is its complexity or unfamiliarity. We first
"appreciate" music when we internalize its stylistic
structure, develop expectations about what we are likely to
hear, and get pleasure when they are realized. A new piece
in a somewhat familiar style fits our general expectations
but the details are jarring; thus, one begins with
expectations that are violated by a complex or novel piece,
causing a search for a sensible narrative interpretation of
what one hears.59 The partial match causes satisfaction; the
partial mismatch precludes boredom (at least till a piece
becomes "too familiar")." Again, my main point for now, is
that it is not at all clear how to elicit information about
"how happy" subjects are given the possibility that the
varieties of "happiness" are so distinct. Questions can
emphasize short-lived body pleasures or (distinct? more
significant?) pleasures of the mind, and if we try to gather
58. Note that the "additive" moment-based schema that Kahneman employs
for measuring objective happiness over a period cannot directly account for the
significance of sequencing; it should do so indirectly, though, if a particular
sequence of (past) emotions gives rise to a positive emotion (or negative one)
that would not have occurred had prior events occurred in a different order. See
Kahneman, Experienced Utility, supra note 5, at 678 ("[Tlhe contribution of an
element to the global utility of the sequence is independent of the elements that
preceded and followed it .... In a moment-based treatment... the elements of
the sequence that is to be evaluated are not events but rather moment utilities
associated with events. Because all the effects of the order of events are already
incorporated into moment utilities, the order of these moment utilities no longer
matters."). The (practical) scaling problem is a hugely difficult one though to
solve in these cases. Unless we have a good way of accounting for the ultimate
(high?) intensity of the final experience, those who experience "pleasures of the
mind" will appear unhappier than they are, because some of their
instantaneous reports should be negative.
59. For an early, less explicitly psychological argument to this effect, see
LEONARD B. MEYER, EXPLAINING MUSIC (1973). For a revised, more complex and
explicitly psychological reinterpretation, see EUGENE NARMOUR, THE ANALYSIS
AND COGNITION OF MELODIC COMPLEXITY: THE IMPLICATION-REALIZATION MODEL
(1992).
60. See William W. Gaver & George Mandler, Play It Again, Sam: On Liking
Music, 1 COGNITION & EMOTION 259 (1987).
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information about both, the scaling problem may well be
insurmountable.
3. Integrated Versus Dissolved Views of Pleasure and
Pain: Reflecting on the Pain Duration Experiments and on
Hedonic Adaptation. The problematic nature of the basic
claim in the "new hedonics" literature is perhaps most
clearly revealed if we analyze what strikes me as the
strongest data supporting the proposition that the total
amount of "pain" and "pleasure" each of us has felt is a real
fact that can be misreported by a good faith subject: the
pain duration experiments. Recall that the experiments
demonstrate that increasing the duration of pain while
lowering the end point level of pain leads to a decline in the
reported level of pain for the whole incident.61 It seems to
violate certain intuitive logical/mathematical principles
(usually referred to as violations of "dominance" rules) for a
61. Recall that those who view this as a simple reporting error believe that
the root of the reporting error is the fallibility of memory. Unable to recall and
sum all of the moments of pain in a long sequence, people simply recall what is
easiest to recall-the last moment and the worst moment-and assume that
when they report on those moments, they are probably reporting the entire
experience accurately. In this sense, the "error" peak/end reporters make is
much like the error that subjects make generally when they make global
evaluations of a set by reference to salient prototypes, ignoring base rate
information. This interpretation is the one proffered in Charles A. Schreiber &
Daniel Kahneman, Determinants of the Remembered Utility of Aversive Sounds,
129 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 27, 28-30 (2000), drawing on Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 80 PSYCHOL. REV.
237 (1973), on base rate neglect more generally.
It is possible, of course, that peak/end reporting is an "error" but that it is
nonetheless functional to attend both prospectively and in real time (not just in
recalling and reporting) only to the worst and final pains one will suffer during
an incident. The reason that we recall peak/end data may be that these
moments are especially rich in self-relevant information. Peaks tell us
something relative to our capacity to withstand pain (so that a relatively low
peak means that the episode presented-and such episodes will present-few
coping problems) and endings permit us to know where we stand with certainty.
"Peaks and ends... earn their privileged status because they carry more
personal meaning than other moments." This account of peak/end reporting is
taken from Barbara L. Frederickson, Extracting Meaning from Past Affective
Experiences: The Importance of Peaks, Ends, and Specific Emotions, 14
COGNITION & EMOTION 577, 588 (2000). I suspect, though, that Frederickson's
view, like the one I am about to explore in the text, is that peak/end reporting is
not an "error" at all, but that "reflective" judgments of chunks of time encoded
as discrete "incidents" are (at least) just as "real" as moment-by-moment
additive judgments.
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person to feel he was happier if he added a poorer
experience to an identical experience. But that intuition
depends on believing that happiness is simply the sum of
aversive and pleasant physiological momentary
experiences. Just as it is not clear that happiness is the
reflected stable understanding and evaluation of an
experience that persists across time, or, as skeptical
economists/preference utilitarians would declare, that
utility is simply the instantiated outcome that we reach if
we obtain an end-state that is chosen under conditions of
perfect information, so this assertion is hardly
uncontroversial.
While I will largely focus my attention on the peak/end
problem, the arguments I will raise in discussing whether
peak/end pain reporters are "in error" could be raised in
other psychologically significant contexts as well. For
instance, if one carefully explores the relationship between
"certainty" and hedonic adaptation, I think one will also
find that subjects typically violate the simple additive or
"mathematical" view of hedonic satisfaction that the early
Kahneman posited as the sole rationally defensible account
of hedonic satisfaction.
The basic, robust finding of the uncertainty/adaptation
literature is that people may adapt better (and hence "feel"
better, at least in some meaningful sense) when they are
sure something bad has happened than when they are
largely (say, 95%) sure but still see a way out. In this
regard, those who receive bad HIV reports or a firm
diagnosis that they have Huntington's disease seem "better
off' than those not yet informed, but highly suspicious, of
their status.62 Under one view, of course, the person with a
100% chance of something bad happening is just like the
person with a 95% chance except that as to the last 5%, he
is in worse shape. One way of putting that is that state X is
being 95% certain that one is HIV positive, and that state is
present both in those who are certain that they are HIV
62. See generally Jeffrey M. Moulton et al., Results of a One Year
Longitudinal Study of HIV Notification from the San Francisco General
Hospital Cohort, 4 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROMES 787 (1991);
Jason Brandt et al., Presymptomatic Diagnosis of Delayed-Onset Disease with
Linked DNA Markers: The Experience in Huntington's Disease, 261 J. AM. MED.
ASS'N 3108 (1989) (although sample sizes are small, people seem to cope well
when they receive alarming genetic test results, particularly if they are
anticipated to some extent).
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positive and those who are not yet informed but are fairly
sure that they are HIV positive. If state Q is "a lottery
ticket with a 5% chance that I learn information about my
HIV status and the information that I learn is that I am
HIV positive" and state R is "a lottery ticket with a 5%
chance that I learn about my HIV status and the
information that I learn is that I am HIV negative," one
plainly prefers R to Q, but one may not in fact prefer the
sum of X and R to X and Q.6" The reason, presumably, that
the mathematically rational dominance model seems to fail
is that it does not seem to deal with the "integrating"
experience agent-the "ego" that adapts to bad news and
somehow goes on, or suffers from prospective anxiety so
long as he possesses lottery tickets rather than certain
information.
In a sense, one could argue that the presence of such an
"integrating" agent makes a whole slew of end-states"complementary" that would not otherwise appear to have
such a quality. Obviously, perfectly conventional rational
choice theorists recognize that a chooser C could prefer X +
Z to Y + Z even if he preferred Y to X if X and Z were in
some sense complements-e.g., if X were a condiment that
went especially well with some food Z though it is not very
tasty on its own-but we typically think of complementarity
63. Alternatively, one could frame this point by noting that it is clear that
the subject prefers state E, HIV- status, to D, HIV+ status: but that ordinarily
implies that the expected value of a 95% chance of D plus a 5% chance of E is
valued more than a 100% chance of D. The fact that this set of preferences
violates ordinary rationality conventions can be seen if we imagine the state E
being "winning" $1 million-parallel to HIV negative status-and state D being
winning only $100. It would plainly be better to have a 95% chance of D and a
5% chance of E than a 100% chance of D, and we would think we would be able
to infer that from the fact that E is preferred to D.
The conventional rationality principle that this violates is Savage's "sure
thing" principle-the principle that if one is offered a lottery X and lottery Y
which differ only with respect to the fact that X contains prize A as one prize
and Y contains B, that one rationally "must" prefer X to Y if one prefers A to B.
My main point for now is the fact that Savage's sure thing principle is not true
in relationship to adapting to very bad news suggests that rational
addition/dominance models may fail more generally, not just in the pain
duration cases. For the initial formulation of the "sure thing" principle see, L.J.
SAVAGE, THE FOUNDATION OF STATISTICS 21-26, 76-82, 103 (1954). For an
excellent discussion of the principle and a critique, expressing strong doubts
that human beings invariably make choices consistent with the "principle," see




in consumption as a special, minor case, that we would
expect to find when the goods were used together, in a
physical sense, rather than reconstrued.
Now, I am not claiming that the "integrating person"
here-the "one" who can engage in adaptation or suffer
anxiety-is precisely like the integrator of pain
information-the one who reflects on how painful he found
some "whole incident." In the HIV-example, both the
adapting party and the still-uncertain party are each
plainly having new, ongoing hedonically-charged
experiences (e.g., anxiety, resignation and adjustment)
rather than simply attempting to sum feelings that
occurred in the past. Thus, Kahneman (would plainly)
argue (quite reasonably) that the additive, moment-based
model is adequate so long as we recognize that the
uncertain party has a hedonic reaction not just to the
information set available to him but to the presence of
anxiety and the informed party has a hedonic reaction not
just to the information set but to his reduction of anxiety.
Kahneman implies, in treating the peak/end reporter as
"mistaken," that happiness judgments must be conceptually
disintegrated.' Every judgment of happiness or suffering is
the judgment of happiness or suffering at a particular
moment. And what ecological momentary assessment does
is ask respondents, in essence, how they are feeling now. He
naturally acknowledges that suffering or happiness
experienced at a moment can be caused by past or future
events. We can feel currently unpleasant dread (or feel good)
in anticipating the future, we can joyfully reminisce or
relive horrors. But what we cannot do, in his view, is
"experience" anything but present-tense reactions. If
Patient X feels bad now because he recalls a painful
procedure,65 that is real; but if X simply says he felt bad
64. I believe he might now qualify the statement in the text by noting that
while "happiness" judgments should be disintegrated in the way I imply, there
is more to "well-being" than happiness and (perhaps) some aspects of well-being
could, at least in theory, be discerned only by an integrating agent. Once more, I
discuss the "purer," earlier view both because it is intrinsically important and
because I am not absolutely certain whether the later Kahneman really believes
that aspects of the "fuller" vision of well-being require us to look to reactions
that cannot be properly understood as momentary reactions (even if they are
not momentary approach/avoid reactions).
65. Again, to emphasize the parallel with adaptation to bad outcomes that
have become certain, he may feel good now though he has heard bad news
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during the procedure, that judgment is entitled to no
independent weight. It is merely a (correct or incorrect)
observation or reconstruction of an objective state.6 Note, in
this sense, that X's judgment of the hedonic quality of the
experience is just like a third party's judgment of X's
experience. The fact that he is interpreting his own life is of
no moment.
It is worth reflecting on the family resemblance of this
view to Parfit's argument on personal identity. As a prelude
to his defense of utilitarianism against the commonplace
accusation that it does not take adequate account of the
separateness of persons, Parfit goes to elaborate lengths to
show that choices made to benefit one's own future self are
scarcely distinct from choices made to benefit others." To do
because his anxiety is reduced or he is now meeting his (lowered) hedonic
expectations.
66. If the person who has seemingly adapted to the "bad news" state
misreports happiness not because he has become happier but because he
reports the same lower level of happiness as a better state once his expectations
of happiness decline, then, in Kahneman's terms, he has not really adapted
hedonically. Kahneman, in fact, hypothesized that people do not shift the
degree to which they react positively or negatively to experiences as a result of
having had good (bad) experiences, but simply report the same range of
good/bad reactions as better or worse depending on the degree to which they
expect high or low levels of good (or bad) reactions. See Kahneman, Objective
Happiness, in WELL-BEING, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 5, at 13-14; Kahneman,
Experienced Utility, supra note 5, at 685-89.
67. See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 199-347 (1984). Even if Parfit
convinces us that persons are less integrated than we typically believe, this may
do far less than he hopes to revive the argument that utilitarian ethicists
legitimately ignore the separateness of persons and focus on maximizing the
occurrence of hedonic pleasure, regardless of the locus of that pleasure. For one
of many sustained arguments that Parfit's argument is at core a non sequitur
(as even a presumptive defense of utilitarianism) see Bart Schulz, Persons,
Selves, and Utilitarianism, 96 ETHICS 721, 732 (1986) (stating that Parfit can
claim no more than that his Reductionist view of persons makes it less likely
that we will attend to the distinction between individuals, not that it will
obliterate it).
Moreover, Rawls argues that so long as stable societies can exist that govern
themselves using a more Kantian conception of persons-in which people view
themselves as autonomous and take responsibility for their fundamental aims
over a far greater period of time than anything we could call an "experience"
would last-the fact that a different view of persons might also be
metaphysically plausible is of little moment. Rawls states:
One can imagine people who are hedonistic and individualistic; their
lives lack the connectedness and sense of longer purpose needed for a
Kantian view to work. But that this may happen under certain
conditions so far shows nothing about what is desirable from a moral
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this, he must dissolve conventional ideas of identity,
arguing, for instance, that we should be unconcerned about
our own deaths if (under certain science fiction
assumptions) another being with our memories and
intentions still existed. What links fundamentally separate
selves over time is not some "further fact"-like some extra-
bodily Cartesian ego to which all of the events in "a
person's" life happen-but more contingent psychological
links (memory of the past, intentions towards the future,
similarity in beliefs)."8
point of view. There is no degree of connectedness that is natural or
fixed; the actual continuities and sense of purpose in people's lives is
relative to the socially achieved moral conception. Thus the essential
point is whether the well-ordered society corresponding to a moral
conception generates in its members the necessary continuities and
sense of purpose to maintain itself.... [A] utilitarian view would be
supported by the general possibility of discontinuities only if social
theory showed that in the case of other conceptions the requisite
connectedness could never be brought about.
See John Rawls, The Independence of Moral Theory, 48 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM.
PHIL. Assoc. 5, 20 (1975).
68. Again, I am not sure how much of this philosophy of mind material is
my cup of tea (or was at the moment I wrote this, when I was a different
person)? But in the fully dissolved view, virtually all of our moralistic social
practices disappear. It is bizarre, for instance, to punish someone for something
he already did (or, to focus on the effort to dissolve the distinction between the
self and others that Parfit is pushing in his defense of conventional
utilitarianism, no more rational to punish a criminal than his son for his
misdeeds). This would appear to be the case because "he" is no longer the
criminal. Nor would it be especially plausible that deterrence could work
because no one has any good reason to plan, to avoid future consequences that
(after all) really occur to someone else. Parfit notes that as memory fades, we
are less connected to our past selves-and in his view, less justly punished for
that past "selfs" conduct, just as we would be less morally bound to keep "his"
promises. He is relatively ambivalent about the effect of thinner views of
identity on punishment and promise-keeping in PARFIT, supra note 67, 323-39,
but by the time he had written, Derek Parfit, Comments, 96 ETHICS 837 (1986),
his views on the issue were far firmer, and more cleanly reject the conventional
moralistic positions.
Just as some are dubious that the philosophy of mind has much to do with
the battle between utilitarianism and Kantian theories, it is also questionable
whether conventional "moral practices"-e.g., of promise-keeping or
punishment-really depend on the metaphysical presuppositions. The fact that
we might have trouble justifying punishment in a case in which our
commonsensical judgments about the continuity of a person-in body terms,
memory terms, "further" terms-were most strained (e.g., by memory loss, or
science fictional transportation of memory to another body) tells us little about
whether the metaphysical identity assumptions actually ground the routine
practices. For an elaborate argument to that effect, see Mark Johnston, Reasons
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and Reductionism, 101 PHIL. REv. 589 (1992). See also Samuel Scheffler, Ethics,
Personal Identity, and Ideals of the Person, 12 CAN. J. PHIL. 229 (1982). Parfit
indeed came to believe both that punishment for past misdeeds was inapt and
that it was senseless to attempt to compensate someone for causing him pain,
since one would inevitably "compensate" a significantly distinct being. But the
point strikes me as fundamentally somewhat obtuse. It is hardly clear that one
could "deserve" punishment-under any conventional account of desert, even if
one were punished moments after one took bad acts-unless we conceived of
"evil choice" as something performed by integrated individuals, capable of
devising meaningful life plans. The dissolved "later" person is not so much non-
punishable-as Parfit suggests-because he is not the blameworthy one,
(though such a person did exist, albeit fleetingly?) as he is non-punishable
because no one could justly be punished in a world in which lives were dissolved
into (significantly) disconnected moments, with no transcendent agent able to
choose a life plan or moral posture. PARFIT, supra note 67, 323-26.
Similarly, the point about compensation appears to me a non sequitur.
Assume that I agree to allow you to harm me in some fashion in exchange for a
later payment. What justifies your causing me harm may well be my agreement
that you can harm me (my belief that I am not so dissolved that I find it
preposterous to sacrifice anything for the sake of some disconnected future me,
coupled with my "right" to waive my prima-facie, but alienable, rights against
certain forms of harm-causing). See Christine Korsgaard, Personal Identity and
the Unity of Agency: A Kantian Response to Parfit, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 101,
130 (1989). Parfit cannot sensibly argue that such concern for the distant future
is so irrational as to vitiate the ostensible consent, if he is to allow exchange at
all, for in any complex exchange action, the parties will inevitably reap benefits
at a particular point in time. Thus, assume the actor agreed to some smaller
level of instant gratification/compensation in the more immediate future. At
some level, any delay poses the same conceptual problem as long delay (why
should the only sentient being-the present tense I-care about another being,
some future sentient being who remembers lots about me), but at another level,
he could justifiably kick himself for having overvalued a "self" that will soon be
significantly gone (merely "remembered"). If there is no reason for the "present"
I to care about the future, there is no reason for him to care about the present
either, knowing it will soon be past. I take this to be one view of Korsgaard's
point that:
It is misleading to ask whether my present self has a reason to be
concerned with my future selves. This way of talking presupposes that
the present self is necessarily interested in the quality of present
experiences, and needs a further reason to care for more than that. But
insofar as I constitute myself as an agent living a particular life, I will
not in this way oppose my present self to future ones.
Id. at 126-27. In arguing for compensation in situations in which prior
agreement was not obtained, it seems to make more sense to think about
mimicking the agreements that might have occurred than to assume that no
such agreements ever would have.
More pointedly, I think, it is hard to understand such future-regarding
practices as disciplining your children for the sake of their adult selves if the
"child" we love is as thoroughly disconnected from her adult embodiment as
Parfit suggests. (If he is right that persons are linked solely by memory and
intention, then children and adults are scarcely linked, especially if one is
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Now, of course, Kahneman and Parfit's views hardly
jibe. Parfit is arguing that the question of whether Person P
is happy (over time) is scarcely meaningful. We can (and
should) sum the experiences of all persons as readily as we
can sum the happiness of P. Parfit aspires to make us more
impersonal, to get us to focus less on persons and more on
experiences. Kahneman, on the other hand, wants to
maintain the notion that (some conventionally defined) P's
happiness (summed over time) is significant enough to try
to measure, but it is never clear why we should wish to do
that unless that person P has some transcendent identity.69
talking about very young children. Adults will typically not remember all that
much of childhood nor does the child have many firm intentions about "his"
adult future). A variant of this point is emphasized in Susan Wolf, Self-Interest
and Interest in Selves, 96 ETHICS 704 (1986).
69. It is interesting in this regard to note the relationship between two
questions that are often radically separated in the philosophical literature on
identity, the literature on what makes a person a person. One question we
might want to answer is what distinguishes persons from non-persons (this
generally includes a discussion of why we might be more concerned in a moral
sense with those we think of as persons). Another issue we are interested in is
what makes P the same person at time 2 as he was at time 1. It might be
helpful to note that the ways in which we are the same "person" across time
might be the source of what is (morally) special about us. We are meaning-
giving agents over time. In this view, what makes (most of us) care more about
the pain and pleasure experiences that occur to people than to animals is that
people have conceptions of more and less pleasurable lives, as well as the
capacity to sustain relationships and plans over time. As Wolf puts it:
This provides a reply to a proposal sometimes suggested by Parfit that
we should care more about the quality of experiences and less about
the persons who have them. For the value of persons is not, as this
proposal would suggest, dependent on their ability to have such
momentary experiences .... If the reason we care about persons is that
persons are able to live interesting, admirable, and rewarding lives, we
may answer that time slices of persons, much less experiences of time
slices, are incapable of living lives at all.
Wolf, supra note 68, at 709.
There is also, of course, a view-from my obviously limited understanding, I
take this to be the commonplace view among evolutionary biologists-that
persons are typically bound across time for a reason that makes no reference at
all to what is or mightbe unique about people (compared to other animals,
plants or even microbes). The human body (like any living organism) is just a
"survival machine" containing those genes (whether acting alone or in quite
complex combination) that have become most prevalent over time because they
reproduce themselves most frequently. The self in that view is integrated over
time precisely to the extent that behavioral integration increases the chances of
gene replication. (Thus, genes that produced disintegrated behavior of the
extreme form: "Prefer pleasure in pre-reproductive phases of life that posed
enormous risks of dying before reproduction because the selves that would be
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Without such an identity, balancing pains and pleasures
over a lifetime is not a sensible strategy. Parfit seems right
that self-centered indifference to one's future-in the sense
that it is of no more importance than anyone else's life-
would be appropriate if it were not in some sense yours.
In a sense, then, Kahneman tries to adopt a middle
position in between the conventional position on identity-
what gives us identity is our capacity to integrate
experience and it is the integrator of experience that we
care about both as a moral entity and as the subject of
welfare measurements-and Parfit's radically dissolved
position-that there is no such integrator and therefore we
should care less about the locus of experiences (as
deontological rights-based theorists do) and more about the
experiences themselves. I believe that Parfit's view of the
dissolved self-which Kahneman's is actually foundation-
ally closer to-is very difficult to defend.0 What I am
alive to reproduce are not really 'me' " would probably not have survived). By
and large, one would assume that selves would be pretty integrated as carriers
of the replicating genes-and that the survival of this integrated self would
have priority over the survival of others precisely because non-related others
would typically not be vessels for the replicating genes. At the same time,
though, selves are not "profoundly" integrated. For instance, a replicating gene
would have been just as likely to become prevalent if it produced behavior that
manifested less care for its future self than for the survival of a high number of
gene-sharing siblings. Moreover, while genes replicate successfully enough to
become prevalent in part because they dictate behavior in the organisms in
which they are embodied-a view that implies that the "continuous body" is
meaningful as the repository of genes and the vehicle for their survival-genes
may survive because they impact the environment outside the body as well (e.g.
by secreting chemicals that alter the behavior of would-be predators), so that
the idea that the body containing genes has some "unique" genetic significance
is surely overstated. The usual accessible account for us lay readers trying to
make sense of these views is RICHARD DAwsON, THE SELFISH GENE (2d ed. 1989).
70. I make a brief argument in the text to that effect, but also wanted to
explore another way of getting at why Parfit's views on this matter are so
controversial. I think it could be helpful as well in judging both the plausibility
of the view that well-lived lives are "integrated" rather than dissolved and the
analytical distinction between Kahenman's "moment addition" conception of
welfare (associated with "thin" views of persons) and "reflective" views
(associated with "thicker" views of persons) to reflect more on some of what
strike me as the most powerful critiques of Parfit's work. In this regard, it
would be especially helpful to interrogate the meaning of Parfit's claim that
what links us with our past "selves" is nothing more than (weaker or stronger)
memory-just as what links us to the future is weaker or stronger intentions.
The notion that all that links us with our past is memory is subject to the
(familiar) critique-apparently dating back to Berkeley-that the claim is
circular. If X and Y each "recall" having seen the Eiffel Tower from a passing
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Metro train, what could make X's belief a memory and Ys a delusion? X's is a
memory if and only if the event actually occurred to him; but to know whether
the event occurred to him, we must have some separate account of his identity
(beyond that he is an entity linked by memories). Thus, the effort to define
identity in terms of memory (Y is the same person as X only insofar as he
recalls events in X's life... ) fails, for we would then need an account of identity
to define memory. For a far fuller discussion of this point, see Marya
Schectman, Personhood and Personal Identity, 87 J. PHIL. 71 (1990).
For my purposes, Parfit's effort in REASONS AND PERSONS 219-226, to avoid
the circularity problem by invoking the idea that people can have what are
generally called quasi-memories (pictures of events that actually were caused
by a person's experiences rather than imagination) without invoking the idea
that it was their experience that caused the sensory picture) are largely
irrelevant. What I need to focus on is what strikes me as his fundamentally
narrow understanding of memory, an understanding that permits him to
maintain his very thin view of persons, and to ignore the ways in which
"identity" might be nothing more than the features of personhood that make it
thick rather than thin.
My argument about the inadequacy of Parfit's account of memory does not
depend directly on the circularity critique nor, therefore, is it answered by the
invocation of quasi-memories. What is far more significant in my view is that a
reasonable phenomenological account of memory (and intention) entails thick,
not thin, identity, the capacity to integrate events over time and to narrate both
a past and a set of life plans that transcend highly particularized sensory
memories (or detailed micro-plans).
Most actual recollections are, first, not fully detailed single sense
impressions, but meaning-infused summary impressions of events, and even
precisely recalled sense impressions may make sense only given a backdrop of
far vaguer personal recollections (which, quite critically, cannot themselves be
reduced to direct sense impressions). The most suggestive way of putting it is
that no one but me could have my memories; the "memories" are a product of
my construal/reduction/interpretation of a host of life experiences whose sense-
impression details are largely lost. Thus, one of many accounts of the "thicker"
version of me is "that unique person capable of having my memories." If we try
to follow Parfit's science fiction experiments and imagine "memories" taken
from X's head and transplanted into Y's, it seems that Y will either find the
traces of sensory memory confusing and incomplete (that is, he will not really
have more than confusing bits of X's memory), or if he gains enough (of X's
meaning-giving) context so that the memory is not vague and confusing,
incredibly unsettling because it will appear (from the inside) as he thinks that
he has lived an unfamiliar life or is having a delusion.
Assume, for instance, that you receive (by Parfits's sort of sci fi memory-
transplant) what strikes me as an atypically vivid memory from my
(disturbingly) long-past adolescence, a "memory" of walking in a park near my
parents' home with a girl I had a long-entangled, remarkably dysfunctional
relationship with. My "memory" of the physical appearance of the park is
almost surely suffused with my separate knowledge of the park (which I have
surely walked through more than a thousand other times). Thus, if all you
received were a sense impression not reinforced by separate knowledge, you
would receive far less vivid detail than I actually can summon (though it might
conceivably be in some limited senses a more 'accurate' portrayal of the park in
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1969, since what I now experience as my 'memory' may be distorted by
subsequent changes in the park). If the park seemed familiar to you (is part of
what Parfit understands as transplanted "memory" the appropriate sense of
familiarity or is it 'merely' the sensory recall?), though, that familiarity would
doubtless be unsettling to you rather than nostalgic (if you have never been
there, the ability to recall a physical space you walked through briefly more
than thirty years earlier would itself be a source of disquiet, not context).
Similarly, my recollection of the girl's appearance in the memory is doubtless
colored by innumerable interactions (both before and since the event), and is
sensible, in many ways, not as a sensory memory but as an interpretation of
how I had come to believe she looked at that point in time given my feelings for
her. Here is another version of the same problem with the sensory impression
view of memory: when I recall the girl, she in some sense "appears" to be (more-
or-less) "my" age. (This is true only in some very complex, interpretive sense.
She is "my" age in part because I do not encode myself as having any particular
age when I envision her age in relationship to my own. It is clearer to me, then,
that she does not look "older" or "younger" than that she looks any particular
age at all. Thus, older and younger are not interpreted, in my mind, as older or
younger than any particular pictured, embodied age-type. I encode her as
neither older nor younger dominantly in the social meaning sense: e.g., she does
not seem "different" from me or inappropriate). If, though, I received a wholly
sensory image of the transplanted memory of some girl who looked just that
same age from some Parfit-ian science fictional memory-donor, she would surely
look like a kid to me, look essentially like someone my teenage sons go to school
with. Encoding her physical image in that way, though, would distort my
meaning-infused memory of the interaction.
The detailed sense of my (highly) anxious and miserable (but also partly
ecstatic) state would be senseless without thoroughly "understanding" the
complex history of the relationship, most of which I could not encapsulate in
any other set of particularized, detailed sensory memories that I could readily
"ship out" for transplant. (I could tell you, in some general sense, that we had
innumerable phone conversations of a certain sort, but I cannot recall any
conversations in detail, let alone verbatim, as direct sense memories. Certainly,
I could use-inevitably inadequate-words to describe the nature of these
phone calls; to the degree you "understood" and integrated my account, you
would do so both imperfectly and in a fashion that probably reflected your own
experiences more than mine). I am not linked by (more or less accurate)
memory to the person present at that event. Memory of the event is something
that only (a thick, meaning-giving) "I" can provide. That thick "I" need not be a
mystical transcendent Cartesian Ego; but it may be the vector resultant of such
complex sensory and interpretive systems that it cannot be re-dissolved into
any set of simple components, with certain sorts of knowledge of one another. I
am fairly confident that there is at least a loose family resemblance between
this argument and a series of far more complex arguments made against the
possibility of artificial intelligence by people like Dreyfus, but I totally disclaim
the ability to explore that angle at all. See HUBERT L. DREYFUS, WHAT
COMPUTERS CAN'T Do: A CRITIQUE OF ARTIFICIAL REASON 197-217 (1972).
Another way of putting this point is that Parfit gets very little by saying
that persons are dissolved strings of experiences connected by "mere" memory
because there is not much about "memory" that is "mere;" memory itself is one
of the main manifestations of thick-meaning-giving, non-dissolved experience.
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emphasizing though is that Kahneman's middle view is the
least defensible. Arguments for caring about an agent's
welfare depend on there being an integrated and
integrating agent to care about. In this regard, it is
important to emphasize what I find the strongest basis of
the standard attack on utilitarianism that Parfit was trying
to deflect. The strongest basis of the attack on using the
utility maximization principle without regard to persons
need not be based on any particular theory of the rights of
particular individuals against particular other individuals,
7'
it is at core grounded in the fear that utilitarians adopt the
position they do because they have an overly thin account of
persons, that they view them simply as "containers of
valuable experiences."72 If societies are best construed as
nothing more than a series of such containers (unworthy of
personal identification), then it indeed makes sense to
construe each "container" as a container for mini-
containers. If persons are unworthy of personal
identification, why attend to the claims of the aspect of the
Parfit tells the story as though I would (essentially) have your identity if I read
a log of the life events you believe most critical to you; but the log account of
memory is in my view rather transparently unpersuasive.
71. Thus, in my view, utilitarians are not necessarily vulnerable to the
objection that they pay inadequate heed to the separateness of persons if they
advocate, say, punishing an innocent person to prevent some unjustified harm
to other persons. Such a moral scheme could be grounded in a (relatively
reduced) sense of the importance of not directly harming the innocent (that is to
say, a lower level of agent-relativity), or a (relatively increased) sense of our
duties to protect others against indirect harms. The usual notion is that the
anti-utilitarian intuitions on these issues depend on what is referred to as
"agent relative" moralities (moral postures in which the integrity and moral
status of the actor, as well as the acts, has some significance). My own intuition
is that it is easier to see that agent relative moralities are inevitable-and that
the fact that we might be inevitably agent-relative is an important part of our
capacity to act morally-than it is to defend the abstract desirability of agent-
relative postures. But in each case we are not (necessarily) merely treating each
person as nothing more than a vessel for utils; we might, for instance, take
absolutely no account of the differential capacity each party had to experience
pain or pleasure in making our decision.
72. For a strong defense of this attack on the utilitarian conception of
people, see Rawls, supra note 67, at 5 (1975). See also Amartya Sen & Bernard
Williams, Introduction, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND, supra note 45, at 1, 4
("Essentially, utilitarianism sees persons as locations of their respective
utilities-as the sites at which such activities as desiring and having pleasure
and pain take place.... Persons do not count as individuals any more than
individual petrol tanks do in the analysis of the national consumption of
petroleum.").
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person (his integrative capacities) that most demand such
personal identification rather than those most consistent
with the idea that each experience has a hedonic valence, to
be toted up?
Contrary to Kahneman's assumption (echoing Parfit), it
is not self-evident that there is no significant
observing/planning ego, the "subject" of agency, if not some
Cartesian ego-who balances pleasures and pains across
different periods of life, who evaluates these balances. It is
not unambiguous that the "person" who thinks, "I had a
less painful experience this past week than I had when I
underwent the shorter procedure" is not the most relevant
subject; in fact, I find the claim that Kahneman has
constructed a fictional locus of utility-summing, never
embodied in any actual person, just as facially plausible as
the claim that the "integrator" of experience simply
misremembers his "genuine" experience.
I do not want to discount the possibility that she has
not "construed" the pain differently, that she is simply
misremembering pain that she means to interpret as the
simple sum of momentary sensory experience, but is
cognitively unable to do so; I do not mean to argue that it is
transparently incorrect to view Peak-End reporting and the
associated duration neglect as an error." It also is possible
(though no more than mildly plausible to me) that the
integrator who thinks the longer procedure was "better"
does so because she feels more or less pain now, in recalling
the procedures.
But one cannot discount another possibility: She might
simply be engaged in meaning-giving activity, and what she
cares about is her construal of her life, her ascription of
meaning to events, even purely sensual events. Recall in
this regard Frederickson's intriguing suggestion that
reports of incidents emphasize peaks and ends because
73. I also need to note that I am somewhat suspicious of drawing the
conclusion that people entirely neglect duration in reporting on the hedonic
quality of painful events--even if duration seems to drop out in experimental
manipulations in which there are relatively mild alterations in duration.
Almost everyone I have ever spoken to who reports on the misery of stomach
viruses is quick to note that they are of shorter duration than less painful, but
longer-lasting, respiratory flu. Even within the "stomach virus" category, I have
noted that people report whether they had a four or twenty-four virus. I recall
very few, if any, women (particularly those who chose "natural childbirth") who
have not thought the length of labor salient.
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what is most meaningful in painful events is whether they
could always be withstood (the peak) and whether they
ended as badly as one might have feared while in the
middle of the incident (the end).74 I do not mean to either
embrace or disclaim any particular account of why
"interpretivists" might summarize "painful periods" as they
do: my (more limited) point is that "meaning givers" may
not simply summarize by addition of the valence of all
moments.
While full-blown duration neglect (if it really existed)
would surely seem irrational to me, it would seem (nearly
equally) odd for a person to construe her hedonic state
without regard to the interpretively-summarized meaning
of "conceptually bounded incidents," to believe instead that
her welfare could be understood solely by summing the
moment-by-moment pain scales. Thus, for instance, it
strikes me that nearly all of us would (correctly and
rationally) think we had had a worse day if we had suffered
"8" (out of 10) pain in two utterly different contexts for an
hour each than if we had suffered "8" level pain in one
context for two hours, though this implies a form of
duration neglect.75 Now, of course, it is possible to say that
having two distinct pain sources in the day should cause
more present-tense suffering simply because physical pain
is (ordinarily) a signal of prospective danger and the subject
should react negatively not only to the sensory pain but the
(sensory) anxiety. Even if the source of the pains is not
(two distinctly worrisome) anxiety-causing diseases but
clearly close-ended events, though, we might well believe
that if we suffer two contextually separate traumas in a
day, we should experience worry that our self-protective
74. See Frederickson, supra note 61, at 588.
75. I am far less confident that it would be worse to suffer two distinct one
hour painful periods six months apart than one two-hour pain bout; it is the
concentration of bad events in a short time period, I suspect, that leads people
to construe their lives as running amok, either to worry (in some narrow sense)
that they face crises in multiple domains or to construe themselves (more
broadly) as relatively powerless to ward off bad events.
76. Thus, one obvious explanation for why someone would rather suffer two
hours from an arthritic knee than one hour from the knee and one hour from an
equally painful toothache is that he might have already known that his knee
was in cruddy shape but had no reason to worry that his teeth were failing too.
In this (limited) view, the two-incidents pain is worse only because there is as
additional pain-dubbed "anxiety" in the text-that is higher in the second case
than the first.
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faculties are compromised. But at that point, the distinction
between "construing" how painful one's life is and"reporting" the sum of the pains gets very blurry: the source
of the additional experienced sensory pain when "things are
going bad" is interpretive, not immediately sensory."
What is vital to recognize in thinking about the
possibility of straightforward welfarism, though, is that my
preferred view (or any view that privileges meaning-giving)
reflects (one weak) perfectionist conception: it treats the
capacity to integrate and make sense of disconnected
momentary experience as a (the?) key human virtue and
treats (at least certain) construals by the person whose
experiences are being construed as more authentic than any
summing scheme an external observer might impose. At the
same time, it disclaims (what I take to be the early
Kahneman's implicit, alternative) weak perfectionist view
that people should understand themselves as repositories of
good and bad instantaneous reactions, and correlatively
seek to live the life such a repository would most typically
aspire to,"8 one in which the good in momentary experiences
outweighed the bad to the greatest extent possible."
77. Formally, in his more recent work, Kahneman acknowledges that one
can construct an objective happiness measure over time only if each moment's
pleasure or pain has the same meaning as each other moments. See Kahneman,
Experienced Utility, supra note 5, at 679 ("All moments are weighted alike in
total utility."). He acknowledges the possibility then that two distinct moments
of equal pain might not count equally, id. at 692, but seems to feel that that will
occur only in relationship to some (undefined) moments that have meaning
outside the pleasure/pain domain.
78. Once more, it is worth noting in that in the more recent work,
Kahneman argues that he is simply trying to give voice to the experiencing
subject, not to override the world-view of the meaning-given subject whose
memories of life are (in his view) conventionally (over)-valued. "The goal of this
discussion is not to reject the memory-based view, which is indeed irresistibly
appealing, but to point out that intuition is strongly biased against a moment-
based view." Id. "Maximizing the time spent on the right side of the affect grid
is not the most significant value in life, and adopting this criterion as a guide to
life may be morally wrong andperhaps self-defeating as well." Id. at 691.
79. There are some other problems in the "new hedonics" literature that
ultimately seem less clearly germane to the question of whether it can hope to
avoid "weak perfectionism" but help us better understand that hedonic data is
not simply technically difficult to gather, but that the concept of "happiness"
and "reported happiness" are very difficult to disentangle.
While it is relatively transparent that ecological momentary assessment will
not generate cardinal, fully commensurable and summable utility data, it may
be more interesting, I think, if it cannot even generate stable judgments of
whether events are positive or negative. Kahneman asserts that reactions to
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states are binary, and have a natural zero point: people either like their
situation (and wish it would persist), dislike it (and wish it would end), or are in
equipoise. But there is neither theoretical nor empirical reason to believe that
the state of indifference is a point, as he must assume, rather than a broader or
narrower band.
Kahneman does argue that there is a strong theoretical reason to believe
that the judgment of good and bad has a single zero point. He argues that
judgments of "happiness" are like judgments that a hue is neither dominantly
green nor dominantly red, but "white." Such judgments have a single zero point,
even though our ability to discern where that point is located alters with
context (those exposed to strong red light just before they are asked to label a
stimulus will call light with a higher proportion of red "white"). They are unlike
judgments that a line is "neither short nor long" (though, once more, judgments
about whether a particular line is short or long depends on the length of lines
one has been exposed to prior to the stimulus). His claim is that the length
judgments are driven by the need to communicate in relativistic language,
while the color (and pain/pleasure) judgments are at core driven by shifts in
sensory mechanisms. One way of expressing this insight is to note that
respondents to the color experiments think that all the "white" lights they see
look the same, while those who describe two lines they describe as "neither
short nor long" can still readily differentiate the lines' length. To put it another
way, in Kahneman's view, pain/pleasure, like color, is bipolar rather than
unipolar (length is continuous from shorter to longer, not on one side or the
other of a zero point). He also argues that distinct physiological mechanisms
(triggering approach and avoidance) are present when we perceive good and bad
results (and that we can observe approach or avoidance without having to have
subjects communicate their feelings at all). On the approach/avoidance point see
also John T. Cacioppo & Gary G. Berntson, Relationships Between Attitudes and
Evaluative Space: A Critical Review, With Emphasis on the Separability of
Positive and Negative Substrates, 115 PSYCHOL. BULL. 401 (1994).
Kahneman thus put great stock in the idea that those who historically
reported surprisingly high happiness levels in the "old hedonics literature" (like
accident victims, or the elderly) did not actually "adapt" to their poor
circumstances but simply reported happiness relative to diminished
expectations. (Kahneman refers to this as a "satisfaction" treadmill rather than
a hedonic treadmill; people who have more bad experiences may declare
themselves satisfied with a poorer distribution of good/bad experiences but the
number and nature of good/bad experiences do not alter as a result of past
experience). He argued further in this regard that if hedonic adaptation were
thoroughgoing-rather than hedonic reporting being labile-we would not
observe, as we do, that certain experiences (like cutting oneself shaving) are
always unpleasant, no matter how often they are repeated. But if the most
significant impact of adaptation is to broaden the indifference band (and to
broaden it systematically to include more events of the "familiarly" hedonically
charged sort), then the purported distinction between the old literature's
"reporting errors" and the new literature's "unmediated" responses largely
disappears.
Kahneman's theoretical argument is, in my view, quite unpersuasive. Even
if good/bad judgments are bipolar and nonrelativistic, there is no reason to
believe that the "neutral" (zero point) area does not increase in size. (Thus, it
may be the case that those who have experienced lots of misery find a wide
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The methods we would use to interrogate subjects to
attempt to elicit these distinct forms of data on well-being
are different: in one case, we may (for instance) privilege
instantaneous approach/avoidance ecological momentary
assessment, in another we may privilege death bed
confessionals. Perhaps more pointedly, if one believes, as I
range of once-miserable experiences too ordinary to condemn or avoid, or that
those who have done lots of wonderful things become jaded in the sense that a
far larger range of experiences are neither aversive nor attractive but neutral).
If this is true, the "hedonic treadmill" is real, rather than a satisfaction-
reporting treadmill: it will simply be manifest as a wider zero point for once-
pleasurable experiences. Kahneman, Experienced Utility, supra note 5, 11-12.
My tentative sense is that this problem is related as well to the distinction
between "shifting adaptation levels" and "desensitization." See, in this regard,
Shane Frederick & George Loewenstein, Hedonic Adaptation, in WELL-BEING,
FOUNDATIONS, supra note 5, at 302, 303 ("[Ilt is important to distinguish
between adaptive processes that diminish subjective intensity by altering the
stimulus level that is experienced as neutral (shifting adaptation levels) and
adaptive processes that diminish the subjective intensity of the stimulus
generally (desensitization)."). If you just adjust adaptation levels, you should
still be able to sense distinctions between stimuli. Thus, assume you go to
prison: after a time, confinement in a seven-foot cell may become less
bothersome, but the distinction between a seven and nine-foot cell might
actually be heightened (so you would have experienced adaptation but not
desensitization). My intuition-though it is one I have little confidence in-is
that desensitization among some range of the options that one actually most
typically experiences might be one way of describing a radical increase in the
no-response area.
As I noted, Kahneman believes not only that desensitization is not a very
important part of the hedonic treadmill process, but hypothesized in his
published writing that people do not really adjust adaptation levels either.
Rather, the subject simply changes how he reports the "summary" of any given
level of actual satisfaction. Note, though, that there are some indicators that
what psychologists have perceived as adaptation is not simply a
reporting/memory problem, but is manifest in non-communicative behavior. See
E. Krupat, Context as a Determinant of Perceived Threat: The Role of Prior
Experience, 29 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 731 (1974) (finding that prior
exposures to threats not only lowers subjects' reports of how dangerous the
situation they are in is but reduces galvanic skin conductance); Dar Reuven,
Dan Ariely & Hanan Frank, The Effect of Past Injury on Pain Threshold and
Tolerance, 60 PAIN 189 (1995) (finding that veterans who had suffered more
serious injuries in the past both waited longer before reporting severe pain
when exposed to 48 degree Celsius water, and, behaviorally, terminated the test
by withdrawing their hands form the water later). But there is contrary
evidence as well. See, e.g., Paul Paulus, Garvin McCain & Verne Cox, A Note on
the Use of Prisons as Environments for Investigations of Crowding, 1 BULL.
PSYCHONOMIC SOC'Y 427 (1973) (finding that prisoners do not report higher
levels of feeling crowded when density rises, implying hedonic adaptation, but
they exhibit physical symptoms of stress, like palm sweating more, implying
that they have not adapted).
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have suggested, that a certain degree of duration neglect
may be appropriate because persistent pain in a
(conceptually construed) single domain is less bothersome
than equal or even lesser experienced pain that arises from
(what the subject conceives of as) multiple sources, then the
ecological momentary assessment will always "overstate"
the degree of misery that the chronically ill live with and
understate the degree of misery that those who lack the
internal and external resources (power) to protect
themselves against multiple affronts suffer.8 ° Now, of
course, there is a more straightforwardly political
translation of the weak perfectionist concern there: using
the ecological momentary assessment as an elicitation
method may implicitly under-value the importance of
"power" (the capacity to resist bad events) in "welfare."81
What is ultimately critical though is that no matter what
elicitation technique we use, we are measuring something
that could aptly be thought of as a form of welfare: the
choice to privilege one or the other elicitation mode reflects
nothing more than our own (weak perfectionist) beliefs
about which form of "welfare" people might value is more
expressive of desirable human aspirations.
C. Is "Happiness" Straightforward and Unambiguous
Because its Biological Role is Simple?
A possible rejoinder to the claims I have made that
happiness is too multi-faceted to capture using any single
measurement mechanism derives from one interpretation of
the literature on the biological role of pain and pleasure. In
this view, both happiness/pleasure and unhappiness/pain
80. There is some considerable congruence here between the contrast
between feeling empowered and feeling a good balance of painful and
pleasurable moments that I am drawing and the contrast some (but not all)
psychologists draw between "mood" (the felt capacity to meet challenges) and
"emotion" (momentary affect.) See supra note 55.
81. It will also arguably over-weight aspects of life that take up more of the
day, even though these domains do not weigh quite so much on reflective
understanding of one's life. Thus, someone with a ten hour a day cruddy job
might press the "get me out of here" response button on the Palm Pilot far more
hours a day than someone with a benign job and a cruddy marriage (unless the
cruddy marriage actually weighs on his hedonic state throughout the day,
which it might or might not). It is not clear, though, that the self-reflection of
the person who thinks he is satisfied with his life overall, given the relative
importance of work and family, is entitled to no weight.
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really are far more unsubtle, straightforward phenomena
than I have implied because each serves a particular
narrow biological role: either to induce change-NB for
those of you not good at life management, pain's the one that
should be doing that-or persistence (in the case of
pleasure). However, the most plausible reading of the
biological literature is that the roles of pleasure and pain
are hardly transparent, though I acknowledge that there
are two facially colorable readings of the literature that at
least suggest that two of the problems to which I have
adverted can be overcome.82
First, it is possible to argue that people are happy when
their status is (objectively) good and unhappy when it is
(objectively) in need of change. This seems to permit us to
answer one question I have raised about the propriety of
welfarism.83 Welfarists, armed with the knowledge that
people's happiness reflects their "proper functioning" can
then defend themselves either by disclaiming any (openly
perfectionist) interest in insuring that people "flourish"
(noting that concepts of flourishing are too controversial
and unshared to form the basis of ethics) or by arguing that
people who are happy are flourishing, by biological
definition, given the most plausible accounts of what it
might mean to flourish. Second, it is possible to argue, more
modestly, that even if we cannot say that those who are
happy are inevitably functioning "well" in some
uncontroversial way, we can identify happiness as a stable
phenomenon-should we decide to care about it-because it
is the unambiguous state that people are in when they are
approaching, rather than avoiding, the perceived salient
features of their environment. I take up each point in turn.
82. The obvious problem in getting to that point is that I am not a biologist,
I cannot even do a decent job critically evaluating biology, and cannot stand it
when social science types believe they can draw important lessons from science
that they barely comprehend. Nonetheless, since I think it is tempting to try to
use biology to "rescue" hedonic welfarism in one of two ways, but that neither
ultimately works, I feel obliged to comment a bit on "hedonic biology."
83. This question is the one I posed, see supra note 1, about whether third
party observers should care about how well-off people perceived themselves to
be, rather than any other teleological end-state. One version of the argument
from biology is that it gives more content to the dream that all reasonable
perfectionists seek: to insure that people are "flourishing."
[Vol. 52
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1. Does Happiness Imply Functionality? Assume, solely
for argument's sake, two quite controversial propositions:
First, assume (descriptively) that it is the case that people
are happy when doing things that help them (directly or
indirectly) survive or procreate. Assume, then,
(normatively) that at least some perfectionists interested in
human flourishing would argue that people are flourishing
to the degree that they are successfully fulfilling their most
basic biological role (to pass on their genes).84 What is not at
all plain is that it would follow that subjects who are
happier on balance are more "successful" in meeting the
posited end (gene-line propagation). They might, for
instance, face fewer (painful) threats to their capacity to
meet this end, but might cope so poorly with the ones they
do face that they fail in their "evolutionary" task.
In fact, it would seem that hedonic psychologists who
took the tack of arguing that happy people are those that
are functioning well would need to confront the "insight" (of
great and obvious appeal to the gloomy, of somewhat less
certain evolutionary biological pedigree) that people are
evolutionarily biologically predisposed to be unhappy on
balance.85 The basic intuition behind this view is that our
84. Naturally, these propositions are each enormously controversial. I
discuss the problems with the descriptive proposition in section 2, below. The
normative proposition is obviously hardly self-evident either: some class of
observing perfectionists would plainly think it far from obvious that someone is
flourishing in the way that most expresses what is special about human nature
if all he has been is especially successful at passing along genes.
Here's a parallel point, drawing on the Scitovsky work I adverted to earlier
on the "comfort/pleasure" trade-off. one "reason" we may (arguably) seek
comfort, even though it interferes with "pleasure," is that for most of our
evolutionary history, it was necessary to seek comfort, and there was no reason
to anticipate the possibility that we would satisfy our need for comfort so
readily that doing so would induce boredom. But does the fact that there might
be a sense in which there is an atypically strong biological basis for (one sort) of
satisfaction tell us anything at all useful about the normative status of that
satisfaction? What survival-oriented instincts direct us towards and what either
perfectionists or utilitarian evaluators might think we should try to maximize
need have no overlap. See generally SCITOVSKY, supra note 54.
85. For a good statement of this view of our dismal fate, see Nico H. Frijda,
The Laws of Emotion, 43 AM. PSYCHOL. 349 (1988).
Pleasure is always contingent upon change and disappears with
continuous satisfaction. Pain may persist under persisting adverse
conditions. One gets used to the events that, earlier, delighted and
caused joy; one does not get used to continuous harassment or
humiliation.... The law of hedonic asymmetry is a stern and bitter
law. It seems almost a necessary one, considering its roots, which,
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only real biological need to which approach and avoidance
are directly relevant is the need to do what it takes to get
old enough to reproduce; in order to do that, we need to
develop strong feelings of anxiety and pain (since the
feelings must be so compelling that it seems imperative to
do something to avoid threats to our survival). Happiness,
in contrast, can be fleeting and not very intense and
noticeable, since all it signals is that we need not do much.
Note that this argument, like most such socio-biological
"just-so" stories is not overwhelmingly compelling: it might
be, for instance, that those who are-or appear to be-
happy are better able to attract mates, or might, as a result
of-even unwarranted-optimism, invest more in their
children, increasing the odds that their genetic line
persists. 6
If one couples the observation that there may be
biological reasons to be more sensitive to displeasure than
pleasure with an observation that may be the core insight
theoretically, are so obvious. Emotions exist for the sake of signaling
states of the world that have to be responded to or that no longer need
response and action. Once the 'no more action needed' signal has
sounded, the signaling system can be switched off; there is no further
need for it. That the net quality of life, by consequence, tends to be
negative is an unfortunate result. It shows the human mind to have
been made not for happiness, but for instantiating the blind biological
laws of survival.
Id. at 353-54.
But note in this regard the competing (and at least equally plausible) idea
that it is not so much persistent misery that is functional as something more
like hedonic adaptation. See Frederick & Loewenstein, supra note 79, at 302-03
("Because the persistence of an aversive state is an indication that it cannot be
changed, hedonic adaptation may prevent the continued expenditure of energy
in futile attempts to change the unchangeable and redirect motivation to
changes that can be made."). In one view then, hedonic adaptation makes us
sensitive to small, incremental local changes that are now most likely to be
action-relevant. I may dread (roughly equally) confinement in a seven or nine
foot cell, but if I "adapt," by virtue of a prison sentence, so that seven is closer to
neutral and nine on the positive end, I may take steps to get the nine foot cell
reward. Moreover, the persistence of strong negative emotional states (e.g.,
fear) causes health problems so they are plainly dysfunctional at some point.
86. I have got to confess that I cannot recall ever meeting a socio-biological
argument that seems better than cute. I am partly driven in my critique of such
"species survival" stories by the brilliant observation of the late Amos Tversky:
spotting a truly mangy looking mutt, panting hideously and slobbering away as
it skulked in the foothills near the Stanford dish, he turned to a graduate
student friend and said, "Always remember that evolution is a floor, not a
ceiling."
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merging existential philosophy and prospect theory-of
course, there is gain/loss asymmetry, dimwit, what is any
good thing you could possibly name compared to death and
the dread of death?-then there is reason to doubt that
(overall) happiness signals that one is in "the most
functional biological state."
2. Is Happiness Nonetheless a Functionally Defined
State? Even if those arguing that happiness is simple and
straightforward concede that happier people are not
inevitably in globally superior shape, they may still argue,
in two distinct ways, that happy feelings can be identified
straightforwardly because they have a particular role. But
there is reason to doubt as well either that happiness is
that state needed to guide the organism to "high
functioning" outcomes or even to doubt the more modest
claim that it is simply that state that motivates a certain
kind of action (approach).
In this first sense, observing that X is happy (overall)
does not precisely tell us that he is functioning well
(generally), but tells us, simply, that that he is doing things
that will prospectively be good for him. Being happy
(unhappy), on balance, may or may not be good, but being
happy (unhappy) is a very particular signaling state-the
state signaling that one is in the midst of a biologically
beneficial (problematic) activity.
Even that statement seems exaggerated. Indeed, it
appears that people have certain innate tastes that are
readily biologically comprehensible. The sweet and fatty
foods that we are predisposed to enjoy have life-sustaining
calories, while most naturally occurring dysphorically bitter
tasting substances are poisonous. But extremely sour
tastes-to which we are also apparently naturally averse-
scarcely occurred in nature and seem to have no positive or
negative survival valence.87 The "role" of taste and distaste
in our biological lives may thus often be muted. There is
thus no general reason to believe that we are serving our
biological aims better when we are happy rather than
unhappy-being unhappy because we are tasting bitter
poison may indeed indicate that we are at (biological) risk,
87. See Paul Rozin, Preadaptation and the Puzzles and Properties of
Pleasure, in WELL-BEING, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 5, at 109, 115.
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but being unhappy that we are tasting sour lemon juice
indicates no such thing.
Moreover, because both aversion and attraction
mechanisms can readily be "captured,"88 or subject to odd
interferences, we should expect there to be an even greater
disconnect between either success or failure in performing"survival" tasks and hedonic states. Animals may "feel"
happy, though they are not performing pro-survival tasks
because the mechanisms that make them happy or
unhappy when performing the tasks are "sabotaged."
Happiness does not directly lead organisms to choose well;
it is merely the state that most typically accompanies pro-
survival choices. But even when the creature acts"appropriately," ° it may not be happy, and it may not be
88. Food disgust may conceivably play an important evolutionary role-
arguably, if people were not disgusted by some food, they would eat things that
would kill them. (Though as I note later, they might be able to avoid bad foods
without disliking them in the usual sense). But the mechanisms that permit
evolutionarily necessary disgust to function might be co-opted to insure that
people will feel identical disgust when confronted with foods that are thought of
as religiously impermissible, even when those foods are perfectly safe. Id. at
110.
89. This observation should lead us to raise, once again, the philosophical
question about why a third party observer should care at all about maximizing
welfare. It is not clear that we should care about happiness if the only reason
we purport to care about it is that it (generally) seems to occur when an
organism is engaged in "appropriate" (gene-replicating) activities. If that were
the case, it would seem we would judge the organism to be successful when and
only when it is engaged in "good" tasks ("objectively" identified pro-survival
tasks) and view happiness (at best) as an over and under-inclusive surrogate for
doing such good tasks.
90. The biological evidence on this is very hard for me to sort through with
any degree of confidence, but here is the way I read a series of older
experiments on maternal behavior in rats. Rats are one of those species that
raise only their own young; female rats not only do not care for the young
generally, but may well eat them. Let's assume that experiments establish
pretty convincingly that the non-lactating adult females are in some sense
"unhappy" in the presence of baby rats because the babies are essentially
aversive-smelling to most adult female rats. New (lactating) mother rats are
both flooded with the standard chemical source of "happiness" (oxytocin) and
suppress the aversive smell. Thus, the happiness-is-the-emotion-the-organism-
feels-when-acting-functionally story is that in an animal group in which it
appears optimal (in the pass-along-genes sense) for mothers alone to care for
the young, recent mothers are happy caring for the young, and other females
are not. But "happiness" is more directly mediated by physiological mechanisms
that can readily mis-fire or be "hijacked;" if such hijacking occurs, there is no
reason that creatures will be happy or unhappy at "appropriate" times.
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moved by "mere happiness" to choose to do something
advantageous.
The deeper problem in relationship to people is that the
"capture" or "sabotage" problem may well not be a
sideshow, created by experimental manipulation (like the
removal of a rat's sense of smell, designed to "trick" non-
lactating female rats into finding care of other rat pups less
aversive). The direct survival value of the bulk of human
tasks is really questionable, and we may have our pleasure
and pain centers consistently activated for reasons of little
biological moment. For instance, people learn to enjoy
certain (innately) unpleasant (bitter) tastes (e.g., coffee) by
associating them for a period with (innately) desired tastes
(e.g., cream and sugar);9 figuring out what the biological
gain in doing this will not prove easy unless, in some sense,
we seek (some form of) pleasure for its own sake, rather
than to direct us to seek some further, biologically
"sensible" end. Similarly, people may experience disgust
(and thus act as aversively as they would act if in direct
If you render the non-mother female rats anosmic (e.g., remove the sense of
smell, typically with zinc sulfate), they get far more willing (happier?) to be
around the babies (though still less than the lactating recent moms). However,
merely injecting them with oxytocin (to make them happy) in the baby's
presence is not sufficient, because one has not sabotaged all of the mechanisms
that create approach and aversion. The basic findings are reported in Marianne
Z. Wamboldt & Thomas R. Insel, The Ability of Oxytocin to Induce Short
Latency Maternal Behavior is Dependent on Peripheral Anosmia, 101 BEHAV.
NEUROSCIENCE 439 (1987) and Alison S. Fleming & Jay S. Rosenblatt, Olfactory
Regulation of Maternal Behavior in Rats, 86 J. COMPARATIVE & PHYSIOLOGICAL
PSYCHOL. 233 (1974). At the same time, removing lactating mothers' sense of
smell seems to interfere with their performing maternal tasks even though they
are still atypically oxtytocin receptive. Thus (to try to put the point in
philosophical perspective), maternal tasks do not (inevitably) make the
lactating rats happy in any direct sense (though they are equally "fulfilling" of
biological imperatives) nor does feeling happy around babies inexorably induce
care-taking, but rather the "inclinations" to perform the tasks flow through a
series of pathways that either function in a typical fashion or do not. Happiness
(and lack of aversion) usually accompany species-appropriate, gene-line
preserving tasks, but they need not. Moreover, while happiness might be
thought to be sufficient to channel behavior (even if artificially associated with
a task), it need not be sufficient unless other behavior-determinants (like smell
aversions) are toyed with as well. See also Irwin Benuck & Frank A. Rowe,
Centrally and Peripherally Induced Anosmia: Influences on Maternal Behavior
in Lactating Female Rats, 14 PHYSIOLOGY & BEHAVIOR 439 (1975).
91. See Debra A. Zellner et al., Conditioned Enhancement of Human's
Liking for Flavors by Pairing With Sweetness, 14 LEARNING & MOTIVATION 338
(1983).
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sensory pain) that was never conditioned on any direct
sensory reaction: aversion reactions are "captured" by non-
sensory, meaning-infused aspects of the person. Thus, for
instance, if one (culturally and cognitively) construes food
as coming from a "forbidden" origin (think of eating
something one thinks is incredibly "gross"), one will disdain
it as much as he would disdain something he experienced in
a sensory fashion as unpleasant. For instance, the same
smells are experienced as quite distinct if subjects are told
they are cheese rather than cat feces.92 People do not seem
to act (much of the time) based on a culturally unmediated
set of hedonic reactions; it is, once more, hard to see the
direct biological gain in having aversion reactions"captured" by culture.
Can we nonetheless at least define happiness and
unhappiness as those feelings that motivate distinct sorts of
behavioral reactions (approach and avoidance), even if
being happy on balance is not in some strong sense itself an
optimal biological state or being happy at a particular
moment is not a signal that one is engaged in a task that
will help us approach such a state? I still think not for a
variety of reasons also suggested by a review of the
biological literature on pleasure and pain.
First, it is possible (for people and animals alike) to
learn (through simple conditioned learning, requiring only
some degree of negative experience on some occasions) to
avoid things without (more globally) disliking them so that
it is not clear that the "role" of disliking is to fill a necessary
steering role.93 Again, here is the broader conceptual point:
if it is true that it is not obviously necessary to "dislike"
things in order to avoid them, it may not be possible to
define unhappiness/disliking as that state that exists to
direct us to shift behavior/avoid the immediately present
92. For a discussion on this subject, see Rozin, supra note 87, at 117-118.
93. Some may claim that pain is an especially compelling motivator-I think
this is the mainstream biological answer to Yossarian's question in Joseph
Heller's Catch-22 about the failings of the Supreme Being: "Why in the world
did He ever create pain?.. .Why couldn't He have used a doorbell instead or one
of his celestial choirs? Or a system of blue-and-red neon tubes right in the
middle of each person's forehead. Any jukebox manufacturer worth his salt
could have done that. Why couldn't He?" JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22 189
(paperback ed. 1996). The mainstream answer does not appear quite adequate




situation. In fact, a wonderful, curious finding in food
research is that we invariably come to dislike food that has
made us nauseous but (learn to?) avoid, without disliking,
food that has given us allergic reactions or upper gut pain."
More generally, it seems possible to activate the
"choosing" or activity-directing aspects of the brain
independent of the "evaluative" aspects (even though they
most typically mutually interact); thus, choosing and liking
are at core simply not the same phenomenon. Mix water
with sub-clinical doses of cocaine for recovering drug
addicts and they will choose it over a saline solution at
wildly disproportionate rates, but not only do they claim
that it gives them absolutely no pleasure, they have no
cardiovascular response to the drug.95 One can get similar
dissociations between "wanting" and "liking" on the
negative ("avoiding" and "disliking") side. Thus, for
instance, arachnophobic subjects given naltrexone, a drug
that mimics naturally occurring proteins bound to receptor
cells, thus blocking endorphin and enkephalin
neurotransmitters that might otherwise reduce anxiety,
refused to approach a spider at an earlier stage of a string
of "approach tasks" (look at the spider through a glass,
94. Marcia Pelchat & Paul Rozin, The Special Role of Nausea in the
Acquisition of Food Dislikes by Humans, 3 APPETITE 34, 348 (1982).
95. See Marian W. Fischman, Relationship Between Self-Reported Drug
Effects and Their Reinforcing Effects: Studies with Stimulant Drugs, 92 NIDA
RES. MONOGRAPHS 211, 220 (1989) ("Subjects reliably chose 8 mg cocaine over 4
mg, and both doses were reliably chosen over saline. Neither self-report data
nor cardiovascular measures indicated any differential effects of these lower
intravenous doses."); Marian W. Fishcman & Richard W. Foltin, Self-
Administration of Cocaine by Humans: A Laboratory Perspective, in COCAINE:
SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS 165, 169 (Gregory R. Buck & Julie Whelan
eds., 1992) (finding that drug users selecting low doses of cocaine while being
administered desipramine continue to select the drug over saline solutions
though it seriously modified their positive subjective reactions to the drug; thus,
verbal reports of euphoria or positive drug effects and drug self-administration
dissociate from each other under a number of conditions). See also R.J. Lamb et
al., The Reinforcing and Subjective Effects of Morphine in Post-Addicts: A Dose-
Response Study, 259 J. PHARMACOLOGY & EXPERIMENTAL THERAPEUTICS 1165
(1991) (finding that though subjects persistently chose the lowest dosage of
morphine over a placebo, subjects did not report distinct subjective effects from
the low dosage of morphine; thus, the reinforcing effects of morphine can be
manifest without the drug having subjective effects. Only 38% of users even
knew they had received the 3.75 mg dose of morphine they had selected.
Moreover, there was no correspondence between the degree to which particular
patients reported that they liked low dosages of morphine and their tendency to
self-administer the drug the next time they were given an opportunity to do so).
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touch the spider with a pencil, touch the spider... ), but
reported no higher levels of fear of the spider than those
receiving a placebo.96 Again, the message from the vantage
point of "hedonic philosophy" is more straightforward than
the underlying neuroscience: one cannot simply identify
"things we are driven to choose" with "things that we like"
(even prior to reaching the conventional complications in
preference-utilitarianism about misinformation, regret,
ambivalence and the like). Most typically, but not always,
liking is the emotional state that drives us to seek, but this
is not physiologically-and hence definitionally-necessary.
Similarly, people (unlike animals) do not always choose
to reject what they do not like. Humans appear to be unique
(among the species that we study) in deciding to embrace
things we (in some sense) continue to "dislike." It would
doubtless be interesting to understand more than I do to do
so about why we most typically seem when our reactions
are mediated through social learning rather than when we
act as isolated individuals-though one would have to
understand better than I do non-Freudian psychological
views of masochism to test the proposition that most
instances of approaching the painful are socially accepted or
generated. Some psychologists argue that it is a result of
some complex-and less socially mediated-tendency to
take pleasure in things that ultimately prove harmless
though they once appeared dangerous. In this regard, it is
important to think about our attraction to constrained risk-
taking generally97 (e.g., think of roller coasters, scary
movies, faculty meetings). Thus, to draw on the food
literature again, people are naturally initially averse to
(hot) peppers but in a large number of cultures, they "train"
96. See Arnoud Arntz, Endorphins Stimulate Approach Behaviour, But do
not Reduce Subjective Fear: A Pilot Study, 31 BEHAV. RES. & THERAPY 403
(1993). I am afraid that this is one of many places in which my extremely
limited knowledge of the underlying biology haunts me. I suspect, but am not
really at all sure, that these sorts of findings are connected to findings that
people can (at least under certain atypical circumstances) have "knowledge"
without "awareness" of that knowledge. See, e.g., Daniel Tranel & Antonio R.
Damasio, Knowledge Without Awareness: An Autonomic Index of Facial
Recognition by Prosopagnosics, 228 SCIENCE 1453 (1985) (stating that patients
with prosopagnosia could not consciously recognize familiar faces but their
electrodermal skin responses were elevated when shown pictures of people they
once consciously knew).
97. See generally D. E. BERLYNE, AESTHETICS AND PSYCHOBIOLOGY (Kenneth
Mac Corquodale et al. eds., 1971).
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themselves to like them (usually between the age of 4 and
7). This is true even though those who love the peppers
experience precisely the same neural signals from their
mouths (harmless irritation from exposure to capsaicins)
that they experienced when still finding them
unambiguously aversive. 9'
II. PREFERENCE UTILITARIANISM
A. Preliminary, Peripheral Problems: Maximizing Peference
Realization and the Problem of Non-Self-Regarding
Preferences
I need to pay a certain degree of attention to two
thorny, preliminary problems in preference utilitarianism,
even though each of them is, fundamentally, from the
perspective of "hedonics," a side issue. The point of this
brief sub-section, in essence, is to limit the domain of the
more basic discussion of preference utilitarianism in the
next sub-section to the (relatively) simple case in which
some subject S expresses a preference between some self-
regarding end-state X and some other self-regarding end-
state Y, and we therefore conclude that he is "happier" if he
gets X than Y. In order to restrict the discussion to that
"simple" case, though, I must first discuss problems that we
would encounter if we tried to use preference utilitarian
methods to evaluate how subjectively well off a person was
with her life on the whole, rather than merely evaluating
whether her subjective welfare improved or declined when
one of two events in a restricted choice set transpired. It is
plainly far more difficult to figure out the degree to which a
person's elaborate and multi-dimensional preference set is
satisfied than to determine whether the person received a
particular preferred alternative to a less-preferred
alternative. Second, it is also not easy to determine the
degree to which we should assume subjective well-being
derives from preference-satisfaction generally, or only the
satisfaction of some sub-set of preferences usually dubbed"self-regarding" preferences. In this regard, I must briefly
98. See Paul Rozin, Getting to Like the Burn of Chili Pepper: Biological,
Psychological, and Cultural Perspectives, in CHEMICAL SENSES: IRRITATION 231,
248 (B. C. Green et al. eds., 1990).
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note some of the difficulties involved in defining self-
regarding preferences, and also deal, albeit cursorily, with
the question of whether non-self-regarding preferences are
preferences merely to pursue certain ends or whether
meeting these preferences matters as well.
Preference-utilitarianism is easiest to implement when
it restricts its domain to pair-wise ordinal comparisons; it is
most straightforward to comprehend the statement that the
subject S is "better off' consuming X than Y if she would
prefer X to Y. (Setting aside, for the moment, questions I
return to about whether the preference was formed with
adequate prudence and information) But it is not even
readily comprehensible to say that S is better off if she gets"more of her preferences" satisfied or "more of her desires
met" or that S is better off than T if she gets "more of her
desires met" than T gets of his. Plainly, it would be
nonsensical to think that if S happened to express her
desires as a long list of discrete wishes, most of which got
met, she would be happier than if she would have combined
many of the wishes into a unified end-state description and
noted that she was frustrated in her desire to meet the
restated goal. Thus, if A desires X, Y and Z and can get X
and B desires P, Q, and R and can get P and Q, it is not at
all clear that a preference utilitarian would say that B is
better off than A (or, correlatively, that we have maximized
utility if B rather than A gets what she can get); nor would
we even say that A is happier if she gets Y and Z rather
than X, unless she has got a preference between those two
bundles.99
This particular problem in preference utilitarian
thought is soluble (in theory if not in practice). Harsanyi,
99. In Ronald Dworkin's renowned work rejecting distributive principles
that attend to the distribution of welfare, he seems to attribute to preference
utilitarians the rather incomprehensible view I deride in the text that they seek
to maximize the extent to which subjects satisfy as many preferences as
possible. See Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part I: Equality of Welfare, 10
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 185, 204-220 (1981). Dworkin seemingly finds the following
statement intelligible, "people are as nearly equal as distribution can make
them in the degree to which each person's preferences about his own life and
circumstances are fulfilled." Id. at 204-05. I take it that this same confusion
leads him to discuss whether easily-satisfied people should be considered
better-off, in a preference-utilitarian sense; than people with greater ambitions,
because they (presumably) have "more" of their preferences satisfied, without




among others, reduces all preferences to pair-wise choices
(of increasingly complex bundles that include one's reaction
to frustration of concrete preferences or risk), and deals
with the interpersonal utility comparison quandary by
imagining a neutral agent who chooses between the totality
of one agent X's life circumstances (first assuming he has
that agent X's tastes) and another agent Y's whole life
(assuming he has Y's tastes). Within such a scheme, X is
better off than Y if the neutral agent would choose to be in
X's position (just as S herself is better off in position 1 than
2 if she would prefer 1, overall).10 Thus, questions about
whether we characterize X as having a high percentage of
her (highly disaggregated) preferences satisfied or a low
percentage of her more aggregated ones become trivial and
irrelevant. Similarly, questions about whether X appears
more satisfied solely because she demands less will
disappear if a neutral agent with X's meta-tastes would not
choose X's relatively satiated, low-ambition life.
It is not clear, as well, whether preference utilitarians
should restrict the domain of preference utilitarianism to
choice-pairs with immediate effects on the selfish well-being
of the subject.101 Even if subject S is better off in some
conventionally recognizable sense if he gets the vanilla ice
cream he prefers to the chocolate he disfavors, it is not clear
whether he is "better off' (in the same sense?) if we
collectively follow the policies he favors in relationship to
endangered species. (In distributive ethics terms, is X
"better off' than Y if we follow her preferred political
policies-when she cares intensely about politics-but she
gets far fewer material goods?).1"2
100. See John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and
Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 63 J. POL. ECON. 309 (1955).
101. For some of the many good (and a good deal fuller) discussions of the
issues in these next few paragraphs, see, e.g., GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING, supra note
2, at 13-14, 19-20; JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 83-89 (1984); PARFIT,
REASONS AND PERSONS, supra note 67, at 494-95; Shelley Kagan, The Limits of
Well-Being, 9 Soc. PHIL. & POLY 2 (1992); D.W. Haslett, What is Utility?, 6
ECON. & PHIL. 65, 80-82 (1990); Ernest Partridge, Posthumous Interests and
Posthumous Respect, 91 ETHICS 243 (1981); David Sobel, Well-Being as the
Object of Moral Consideration, 14 ECON. & PHIL. 249 (1998).
102. Note that there may be reasons that we ought not to design political
policies so as to satisfy the non-self-regarding preferences of citizens, even if we
thought people were made better off when such preferences were satisfied in
precisely the same way they would be made better off if other preferences were
met. Dworkin, not atypically, argues that moral/political principles must
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Non-self-regarding tastes may quite regularly be
satisfied without the people whose tastes have been met
even knowing they have been satisfied: connecting the
unknown satisfaction of desires to well-being is plainly
troublesome. Still, people could rationally choose to seek
some end X (e.g., the restoration of an endangered species
to non-endangered status), perfectly aware that they might
never learn whether X occurred, rather than some self-
regarding end Y whose fulfillment (or frustration) would be
unambiguous. Someone might unambiguously believe her
life to have been "better" (more satisfactorily) lived
pursuing certain ends. It would nonetheless be peculiar to
think she was indifferent to whether the ends were actually
attained; thus, it would be incomplete and inaccurate to say
that she simply preferred the activity of pursuing X to the
activity of pursuing Y. Moreover, people could readily have
powerful impersonal ends that they do not actively pursue
(e.g., rooting for a sports team to win a championship). 3
It would be odd to say that a person could not be made
happier by learning his favorite team won the
championship than he might have been made by the
fulfillment of some self-regarding desire (e.g., to eat at an
excellent restaurant) just because the desire (for his team to
win) could have been met without his knowledge or after he
was dead, or because he did nothing to bring the result
about. And yet it would also seem to be troublesome to
translate all (potentially) impersonal desires into personal
ones. While it might be accurate to translate, "I wish the
precede tastes: "[An inegalitarian political system does not become just because
everyone wrongly believes it to be." DWORKIN, supra note 99, at 201. What is
more relevant to the discussion in the text though is that Dworkin further
believes more broadly that we should not attend to the satisfaction of any
"impersonal preferences" (e.g. a desire that life be discovered on Mars) though,
plainly, attending to such preferences need not compromise the formation of
just policy. Id. at 201-04.
103. In a parallel vein, Cohen criticizes what he considers Sen's unduly
"athletic" (or activity-centered) conception of "capabilities." Sen's ideal metric
for distributive ethics focuses heavily on the distribution of such capabilities,
but Cohen notes that we might get a good deal out of things we do not do but
that happen to us. See G.A. Cohen, Equality of What? On Welfare, Goods, and
Capabilities, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 9, 23-28 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya
Sen eds., 1993).
Griffin argues that an exclusive focus on "project pursuit" reflects a
masculine bias; women, he argues, are more likely to appreciate and value
things that happen to us (like being enmeshed in significant relationships). See
WELL-BEING, supra note 2, at 22.
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Dodgers would win the World Series" into "I wish I would
have the experience of watching or hearing about the
Dodgers winning the World Series," it would not be
accurate to translate, "I wish that ethnic violence in the
former Yugoslavia would abate" into "I wish I would know
for sure that such violence had abated." Many subjects
would argue that the impact of the end of the ethnic
violence on their happiness is, at core, beside the point.
Learning of the end of the violence might be more
commensurate with sensory experiences than the wish to
end the violence is commensurate with a wish for a sensory
experience even if the sports fan's "impersonal" wish might
be fully commensurate with a sensory wish because its
fulfillment outside the realm of experience would be
valueless.
B. The Basic Problem: Laundering Manifest Preferences
Even if we put these thorny issues aside, we must
consider whether some subject S is better off if he achieves
some self-regarding end-state X rather than Y if he prefers
that state X to Y. The standard answer is that he does so
only if he were, at the very least, rational,0 4 at least in the
sense that his preferences obeyed certain consistency
axioms, 1°5 and that he is adequately informed about the
104. Some writers identify "rationality" with something more like what I
describe as "prudence" in the text. For instance, Richard Brandt argued that
one's desires are not truly rational unless they would survive "cognitive
psychotherapy." See RICHARD B. BRANDT, A THEORY OF THE GOOD AND THE RIGHT
113 (1979).
105. For those readers (especially those schooled in economics) accustomed
to thinking not about the consistency of underlying preferences, but of observed
choices, it is important to note that it is really preferences, not choices-or what
mainstream economists call revealed preferences-that must be consistent. If S
chooses X over Y and then chooses Y over X, what looks like inconsistency could
be a function of changing tastes or circumstances (e.g., he has become relatively
satiated with X having chosen and consumed it). Since multiple choices cannot
be made instantaneously, the theory of revealed preference is not empirically
falsifiable. Rather it relies on precisely the sort of intuitions about internal
psychological states that it seeks to avoid by reference to behavior. For classic
formulations of revealed preference theory, see Paul A. Samuelson, A Note on
the Pure Theory of Consumer's Behavior, 5 ECONOMICA 353 (1938) and I. M. D.
Little, A Reformulation of the Theory of Consumer's Behavior, 1 OXFORD ECON.
PAPERS 90 (1949).
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qualities of X and Y and is adequately prudent in making
the choice. There are a host of differentially stringent
accounts of when a person is either adequately informed or
adequately prudent, 0 6 but the variations, for my purposes,
are essentially beside the point.
There is an important ambiguity buried in all variants
of the requirement that the subject be fully informed. Must
he simply be more fully informed about the actual, precise
physical nature of the goods he prefers or rejects, or must
he have more information about the causal relationship
between satisfying his desires and his ultimate well-
being? °7 In the former case, we do not need to "correct" his
desires, fully explicated. We merely need to correct how he
has translated these desires into concrete, particularistic
practice. Subject S already knows that he prefers good wine
This point is made quite powerfully by Sen:
Preferring x to y is inconsistent with preferring y to x, but if it is
asserted that choice has nothing to do with preference, then choosing x
rather than y in one case and y rather x in another need not necessarily
be at all inconsistent. What makes them look inconsistent is precisely
the peep into the .head of the consumer, the avoidance of which is
alleged to be the aim of the revealed preference approach. It could,
however, be argued that what was at issue was not really whether the
axiom of revealed preference represented a requirement of consistency,
but whether as a hypothesis it was empirically verified. This line would
not take one very far either.... Comparisons have to be made within a
fairly short time to avoid taste change, but the time elapsed must also
be sufficiently long so that the mutton purchased last time is not still
in the larder, making the choices non-comparable .... In fact, the
concept of taste change is itself a preference-based notion ....
See Amartya Sen, Behavior and the Concept of Preference, in CHOICE, WELFARE
AND MEASUREMENT 54, 56-57 (1982).
106. Some theorists, like Griffin, seem to demand no more than that the
person expressing a desire be formed an appropriate "appreciation of the nature
of its object." WELL-BEING, supra note 2, at 314-15 n.19; James Griffin, Against
the Taste Model, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING 49 (Jon Elster
& John E. Roemer eds., 1991). Others seem to demand that the subject possess
and process a good deal more information before choices are adequately
"corrected." See, e.g., D. W. Haslett, What is Utility?, 6 ECON. & PHIL. 65, 72-74;
John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior, in
UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND, supra note 45, at 55.
107. See Arthur Ripstein, Preference, in VALUE, WELFARE, AND MORALITY 93,
103 (R.G. Frey & Christopher W. Morris eds., 1993) ("In deliberating about how
best to satisfy my ends, extra information is always useful, subject only to time
constraints. Yet if that is all that information is doing, it would seem that I
already know what is good for me, and only be concerned about how to get it. In
contrast, if I am reflecting about what ends matter to me, the role of extra
information is less clear.").
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to water to poison, but when he looks at the liquid in glass
A, he mistakenly believes it is good wine, not poison. His
(long-list) desires, in that case, need not be "corrected" he
must simply translate desire into choice differently.68 In
some sense, it would be odd to think he "desired" the liquid
in the glass (whatever it turned out to be)-true desires are
simply more abstract and end-state oriented than that. Or,
to use Sumner's example, °9 S desires a Caribbean vacation,
unaware that taking it will put him in the path of a
dangerous hurricane. If we knew the full structure of his
preferences (including his priorities and trade-offs among
them), we would know he would reject the concrete vacation
plan if he knew the hurricane would follow its actual
ultimate path."'
108. Clearly, though, it is the case that economists frequently move
(carelessly) from the political proposition that it might well be (politically and
pragmatically) appropriate to allow persons freedom to live in accord with their
own decisions to the clearly false view that people invariably choose what is
best for them. This point was clearly, if not originally, pointed out in John
Broome, Choice and Value in Economics, 30 OXFORD ECON: PAPERS 313 (1978).
It is also the subject of one of the first pieces I published-as a legal academic.
See Mark Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 WIs. L. REV. 769.
109. SUMNER, supra note 3, at 131.
110. I have no doubt that the line between these two forms of information-
correction is less hard and fast than I imply in the text. Assume, for instance,
that one thinks a patient is "under-informed" about how painful a medical
procedure or life event will be. One could readily say she simply misapprehends
the nature of the event. In the same way that our subject in the text mistook
poison for wine, this subject misapprehends the physical nature of cavity-filling
or childbirth labor. But it is also plausible to argue that the person understands
the nature of the event and simply does not "properly" apprehend her reactions
to it (or desires).
The ambiguity is caused of course by the fact that we can describe both
people's instrumental ends and desires at different levels of generality. Because
it is conventional to think that we do not have a true taste for "the liquid in the
glass" (rather than for wine or poison), we typically judge that misjudgment as
narrowly instrumental. But if we recognize that the subject got (broadly) what
he wanted (a good wine) but misestimated how much he would like it, we are
more prone to say that he misapprehended his tastes rather than the good. But
of course he was not (necessarily) fixated on wine itself. Wine may have been a
(broad instrumental) vehicle to a certain sort of consumption happiness and he
was simply misinformed that this good would give it.
Here is another way of apprehending the ambiguity: If we (try) to argue that
one subject misunderstood something about the external world and one
something about herself, we will inevitably be in some trouble (because we have
too quickly assumed the "self" is a subject, not an object). It just is not clear
whether the party "really" misunderstood her "reaction" to cavity-filling or
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If, instead, though we say that any desire that turns out
to make us unhappy is inadequately informed,'11 in the
sense that we did not have the information that it would
make us unhappy,"2 then the role of "information" is more
labor, or "really" misunderstood what these external stimuli do to the body's
pain receptors.
Even if we think that it is best to picture a person who misestimates how
painful she will find a procedure or event as misinformed about the event
rather than about her preferences, there is still a thorny problem we need to
figure out before we know what information a properly informed person should
have. Generally, it appears that people overestimate the pain they will report,
but underestimate the pain they end up reacting to behaviorally. Thus, dental
patients interviewed before, immediately after and three months after a dental
appointment overestimated reported pain, but women ask for anesthesia during
labor far more often than they expect to, thus indicating that they expect to feel
less pain than they actually do. Compare Gerry Kent, Memory of Dental Pain,
21 PAIN 187 (1985), and Arnoud Arntz, Mareleen vanEck & Monique Heijmans,
Predictions of Dental Pain: The Fear of Any Expected Evil is Worse than the Evil
Itself, 28 BEHAV. RES. & THERAPY 29 (1990), with Jay J.J. Christensen-
Szalanski, Discount Functions and the Measurement of Patients' Values:
Women's Decisions During Childbirth, 4 MED. DECISION MAKING 47 (1984). I am
therefore not sure what the fully informed person actually knows about
prospective pain estimation, even assuming that "mistaken" preferences about
situations that cause physical pain involve simple mistakes in apprehension of
the true nature of events external to the subject.
111. This appears to be the position that Kaplow and Shavell ultimately
adopt, though they pay little attention to the question that I ultimately raise in
the text: can we adopt this position without retreating from preference
utilitarianism back to the sort of hedonic utilitarianism that preference
utilitarianism discredited? See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 1, at 411-13.
112. Hedonic psychologists have obviously been most interested in these
sorts of "errors"-ones that are conventionally most readily, if not wholly
accurately, characterized as misapprehensions of one's own future internal
psychological reactions rather than misapprehensions about the nature of
external objects. They have classified a host of ways in which people mistakenly
predict how they will react to a situation. Given that choices and preferences
are formed on the basis of such predictions, the choices will systematically not
work out as the subjects hope.
Some of the conventional psychological conclusions are interesting because
of their generality. Most notably, subjects systematically predict that
circumstantial changes (in their personal lives, in the social world and
environment) will have a larger effect on their happiness than the precise same
circumstantial shifts have had on their life when they have actually occurred in
the past. See George Loewenstein & Shane Frederick, Predicting Reactions to
Environmental Change, in ENVIRONMENT, ETHICS, AND BEHAVIOR 52 (Max H.
Bazerman et al. eds.,1997).
More particular infirmities of judgment are also striking: people
overestimate how afraid they will actually be in stressful situation. See S.
Rachman, Panics and their Consequences, in PANIC: PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES 259 (S. Rachman & Jack D. Maser eds., 1988). They
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illusory than real. Choices that make us happy are only
those choices that make us happy. If they make us
unhappy, in fact, we would not have made them. To the
extent that we think it a good idea to satisfy only those
prospective desires that actually turn out to make us
happy, then there is no independent role to satisfying
preferences: we should simply do what in fact makes us
happy. Truly knowing what makes us happy, though,
requires that we have the ability to measure hedonic utility.
We can no longer hope to determine whether we were
happy by reference to whether we have had desires fulfilled
or been (in some global sense) "informed." But of course, it
makes perfectly good sense that there is no independent
utilitarian reason to satisfy desires. As Brandt noted, there
is really no intrinsic reason to care whether one's desires
are satisfied, except insofar as the fact that one desires
something signals some further fact (most especially that
one is likely to like ex post what one desired ex ante). Thus,
says Brandt, imagine that one said (and felt) at six, "I want
to ride the roller coaster on my 50th birthday." Not only does
the fact that one had that desire not dictate what one does,
it actually provides no independent reason to ride the roller
coaster at all. Unless riding the roller coaster will make you
happy, or help make the world more the way you now wish
it would be, the mere fact that one would be satisfying a
desire is wholly irrelevant.113
underestimate how vulnerable they will be to social pressures to conform if they
place themselves in situations in which conformist pressures will exist. See
Robert J. Wolosin, Steven J. Sherman & Annie Cann, Predictions of Own and
Other's Conformity, 43 J. PERSONALITY 357 (1975). Not surprisingly, they
overestimate the degree to which they will be able to avoid giving in to addictive
drug cravings or the urge to splurge at the shopping mall, so that initial choices
to use drugs or to go shopping might prove hedonically troublesome. See George
Loewenstein, A Visceral Account of Addiction, in GErrING HOOKED: RATIONALITY
AND ADDICTION 235 (Jon Elster & Ole-Jorgen Skog eds., 1999) (on drugs);
Stephen J. Hoch & George F. Loewenstein, Time-Inconsistent Preferences and
Consumer Self-Control, 17 J.CONSUMER RES. 492 (1991) (on shopping).
113. See BRANDT, supra note 3, at 249 (1979). This point is made quite
forcefully in Thomas Scanlon, Value, Desire, and Quality of Life, in THE
QUALITY OF LIFE 185,192-194 (Martha C. Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993)
(relying in part, but not wholly, on Brandt's argument).
There are of course, many reasons that a person might want others to
respect her preferences even if they are not hedonically satisfying and I will not
detail them here. For now, I want to make a relevant preliminary point. It is
really not inevitably the case that we must disclaim any choice that turns out
(hedonically) badly. We might still both embrace the initial choice, and at some
2004]
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meta-choice level, desire that all choices that were made under "adequate
informational" conditions be met, even if we come to recognize that some other
set of choices might have made us happier. But the decision to "ratify"
hedonically imperfect choices cannot be grounded in the sense that doing so will
maximize well-being so much as it maximizes the fulfillment of same sorts of
autonomy ends.
Let us take a concrete case: Suppose, quite plausibly, that naive (under-
informed?) subjects do not adequately foresee the degree to which they might
adapt to life circumstances that prospectively seem quite dismal (or that they
do not anticipate that they will feel less elation once they have actually
experienced great events than they expect to feel). Thus, for instance, assistant
professors facing tenure decisions underestimate how happy they will be in five
years if denied tenure and overestimate how happy they will be if granted it.
See Daniel T.Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in
Affective Forecasting, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 617 (1998). Prisoners
expect to be much unhappier in solitary confinement than they prove to be. See
Peter Suedfeld et al., Reactions and Attributes of Prisoners in Solitary
Confinement, 9 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAv. 303 (1982). See also Elaine M. Sieff,
Robyn M. Dawes & George Loewenstein, Anticipated versus Actual Responses to
HIV Test Results, 112 AM. J. PSYCHOL. 297 (1999) (finding that people
anticipate more distress given a positive HIV test than they actually experience
and anticipate less distress given a negative test result than they actually
experience). They might then make prospective choices (e.g., pull the plug if you
can find a plug; do not get a test to determine HIV status) based in part on a
simple lack of cognitive knowledge about the (supposed) prevalence of hedonic
adaptation.
A subject might well find that learning information about hedonic
adaptation shifted his choices, and even believe that the choices he would make
if more informed about hedonic adaptation processes, would lead him to be
happier, or at least to report higher overall levels of lifetime happiness, but still
not believe the naive choices are really worse. For it is possible of course, to
respond to the information by choosing in a non-welfarist way. The subject may
feel that the reality of adaptation serves, above all, to blunt the significance of
choice in life generally (however things turn out, you will feel less good or bad
about it than you expect). The "lesson" that those who recognize hedonic
adaptation should then perhaps learn is to develop a more generalized
indifference to choices. The subject who resists this "lesson" may thus wish to
make all (particular) choices deluding himself into exaggerating their hedonic
importance, rather than to undergo the less particularized losses that might be
caused if he became more indifferent to his choices and more accepting of fate.
Moreover, subjects may believe that it is worse "to be happy" because one's
expectations have been lowered-even if it really is a form of happiness-than
to maintain higher expectations.
Plainly, one can-but need not-translate these decision rules into welfarist
rules of the form ("seek a stronger commitment to the importance of choice only
if that commitment itself is hedonically worthwhile" or "seek higher
expectations only if having higher aspirations is hedonically satisfying").
Familiar commensurability problems loom large: it may be very difficult to
compare the sort of happiness one gets from accepting one's (more constrained)
lot with the sort one gets from maintaining high expectations. For a good
discussion of related issues, see Jon Elster, Sour Grapes-Utilitarianism and
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There is also no necessary connection between
increasing access to information and hedonically favorable
choice-alteration. Increasing information may make people
more likely to regret their choices on some occasions and be
irrelevant on others. If the goal of "correcting" desire is to
increase the probability that people will be made happy by
getting their desires satisfied, then it is an empirical, not a
logical, claim that increasing the flow of accurate
information will best correct desires (in the apt fashion).
Small children are (mis)informed that Santa will not show
up till they fall asleep; this misapprehension may lead them
to go to sleep (and be less cranky on Christmas day).
114
Giving a squeamish anorexic more information on the
provenance of the foods she is supposed to eat may make it
even more likely that she will starve herself; fuller
information may make it less, not more likely, that she will
make choices that make her happy."5
More generally, the relationship between being more
globally informed and being happy is tenuous at best; but if
all we want to ensure is that subjects are informed enough
to change choices to ones that will make them happier, we
do not really care about either increasing information, per
se, or choice, per se, but only in happiness. The
(controversial) literature on depressive realism suggests not
only that information (generally) need not be pro-hedonic. It
suggests as well that high levels of cognitive realism (well-
processed information about the world) at least correlates
with and perhaps (at least to some degree) causes
depression.' People suffering from depression seem (in
certain older experiments) to be less self-deluded than non-
depressives about the low levels of control they actually
exercise over chance events, like winning prizes in what are
the Genesis of Wants, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND, supra note 45, at 219,
231-38.
114. The example comes from Peter J. Hammond, Utilitarianism,
Uncertainty and Information, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND, supra note 45, at
85, 101. Hammond notes that it might nonetheless be appropriate (in terms of
"respecting autonomy") that (at least certain) decision makers be more fully
informed, whether or not this increases ex post utility.
115. For a parallel critique and example, see ALLAN GIBBARD, WISE CHOICES,
APT FEELINGS 20-21 (1990). For his fuller discussion of the ambiguities and
infirmities of full information idealized preference satisfaction theories, see id.
at 18-22, 183-88.
116. Most of the studies, to the degree they are persuasive at all, speak to
the correlation issue, not the causation issue.
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essentially lotteries-thus, the effect of increasing the level
of (effectively processed) information that people have about
their lack of control in these quasi-lotteries is at best
ambiguously related to happiness. Similarly, classical
experiments seemed to indicate that non-depressives
(unduly) discount negative feedback about their traits or
performance and simultaneously overestimate the veracity
of positive description while depressives absorb negative
and positive information in a less biased fashion. Once
more, it is by no means obvious that clarifying to subjects
that the people who see them, warts and all, are not as
petty or myopic as they might first imagine will clearly
improve their subjective state.'17
Perhaps even more telling, it is not clear generally
whether it is hedonically wise to develop more sophisticated
and discerning tastes.' Once one "learns" to differentiate
very good wines from poorer ones, the poorer ones taste
disappointing, and one may not be happier as a result.
Moving to a meta-choice preference-utilitarianism seems
unavailing: What does it mean to choose to be the
sophisticated person or the unsophisticated one? Which
117. For a typical study purporting to document the existence of such
"depressive realism," see M.M. Moretti et al., Self-Referent Versus Other
Referent Information Processing in Dysphoric, Clinically Depressed, and
Remitted Depressed Subjects, 22 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 68 (1996)
(finding that nondysphoric subjects provided with both negative and positive
social reactions directed at them discounted how informative the negative
reactions were, while dysphoric subjects rated positive and negative reactions
as equally informative). Classic works on "depressive realism" include Shelley
E. Taylor & Jonathon D. Brown, Illusion and Well-Being: A Social Psychological
Perspective on Mental Health, 103 PSYCHOL. BULL. 198 (1988); Walter Mischel,
On the Interface of Cognition and Personality: Beyond the Person-situation
Debate, 34 AM. PSYCHOL. 740 (1979); Lauren B. Alloy & Lyn Y. Abramson,
Judgment of Contingency in Depressed and Nondepressed Students: Sadder but
Wiser?, 108 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 441 (1979); and Lauren B. Alloy &
Lyn Y. Abramson, Learned Helplessness, Depression and the Illusion of Control,
42 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1114 (1982). For a good, if slightly dated,
review essay, see Lauren B. Alloy & Lyn Y. Abramson, Depressive Realism:
Four Theoretical Perspectives, in COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN DEPRESSION 223
(Lauren B. Alloy ed., 1988). One of the better pieces criticizing the "depressive
realism" hypothesis is C. Randall Colvin, Jack Block & David C. Funder, Overly
Positive Self-Evaluation and Personality: Negative Implications for Mental
Health, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1152 (1995).
118. For a good account of this (and other) problems with full information
accounts of well-being, see David Sobel, Full Information Accounts of Well-
Being, 104 ETHICS 784 (1994).
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"self' gets to make the choice?'19 But, if instead, we must
measure whether the person was happier before or after
she became a sophisticated wine snob, we need to return to
hedonic utilitarianism.
It is equally unclear how we might describe preferences
as more prudently formed without taking a peek at the
answer to the question that preference utilitarianism seeks
to duck: is the subject actually happy in the state he has
arrived at? It is hard to establish independent "prudence"
criteria that assure us that the subject has chosen
prudently if, despite some version or other of full
information both about the nature of the object states he
must evaluate and the nature of his ultimate reactions to
those states, he nonetheless prefers something that we
believe is dysphoric. One of the most consistent lessons of
"hedonic psychology" is that people make different choices
in distinct psychological background states.12 ° We could
judge one choice, rather than another, as more prudent only
if we knew it were associated with a better outcome. (And,
of course, for the utilitarian, "better" could only mean
hedonically superior).
Some of the choice-influencing psychological contexts
are fairly predictable. For instance, when in a "cold" (or
non-aroused, dispassionate) state, we tend to mis-predict
the choices we will make in a "hot" state (under duress or
temptation). People overestimate the strength of their
willpower in hot situations 12 _so that a choice to vacation
119. One of the clearest discussions of this familiar point is in Frank Hahn,
On Some Difficulties of the Utilitarian Economist, in UTILITARIANISM AND
BEYOND, supra note 45, at 187, 190-95. The same point is raised in Kelman,
supra note 108, at 786-87.
120. For a good summary, see George Loewenstein & David Schkade,
Wouldn't It Be Nice? Predicting Future Feelings, in WELL-BEING, FOUNDATIONS,
supra note 5, at 85.
121. See id. at 93. Similarly, smokers radically underestimate how likely it
is that they will smoke in five years. See Barbara S. Lynch & Richard J. Bonnie,
Towards a Youth-Centered Prevention Policy, in GROWING UP TOBACCO-FREE:
PREVENTING NICOTINE ADDICTION IN CHILDREN AND YOUTHS 3 (1994). Because we
are fairly certain that the later "hot" (addicted?) decision to smoke is a literally
self-destructive one that would both typically be disclaimed and regretted and is
difficult to defend hedonically, we readily assume that the earlier decision to
smoke is imprudent. Similarly, people (counter-hedonically) choose to have
unsafe sex in the "heat of the moment" even though they planned, before
foreplay, to practice safe sex. See Ron S. Gold, On the Need to Mind the Gap:
On-Line versus Off-Line Cognitions Underlying Sexual Risk-Taking, in THE
THEORY OF REASONED ACTION: ITS APPLICATION TO AIDS-PREVENTIVE BEHAVIOR
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in Las Vegas made by the person who expects to gamble
moderately might be thought imprudent, just as the
decision to gamble extensively while there might be thought
to render choices to stay home on other occasions
imprudent.122 Similarly, "normal-weight" shoppers buy more
food when they enter the store hungry than not, but it is
not clear why-on purely procedural grounds, divorced from
reference to the hedonic outcomes of the distinct choices-
we would say that buying more when hungry (rather than
less when satiated) is imprudent. Thus, we might smuggle
in some substantive hypothesis about how happy the
subject would or should be living with her particular
decisions (Americans eat too much for their own good,
Americans buy too much for their own good). After all, one
could readily argue (a priori, focused more exclusively on
procedure) that one will eat when hungry so that one's
purchases in a satiated state more poorly reflect the desires
one will have at the relevant point of consumption.
The abstract notion that the "cold" choice is the more
prudent one may simply reflect a (more or less well-
analyzed) belief that hot choices work out more poorly,
hedonically. It is not clear, conceptually, what else it could
reflect. It is almost surely the case that the "intuitive"
purportedly procedural preference for "cold" choices is
entirely substantive. It may be (what I have been calling)"strongly" perfectionist (e.g., grounded in the belief that
certain choices are more likely to advance our "real"
interests than others). As a strong perfectionist intuitive
theory, it is substantively Puritanical: the cold chooser eats
less and is more sexually inhibited. Those are good things
only given a strong theory of human flourishing. It may also
227 (Deborah J. Terry et al. eds., 1993). But think about an area where there
might be high-but far less absolute--consensus that the "hot" choice is the bad
one: subjects may well underestimate how likely it is that they will engage in
sex once they get into arousing situations, like dates. See Loewenstein &
Schkade, supra note 120, at 93. But unless one is sure that the decision to have
sex during the aroused period is hedonically worse (or worse in some strong
perfectionist sense if one is willing to disclaim subjective utilitarianism more
thoroughly) than the decision to refrain in the cold period, it is not clear why
one would call one decision more prudent than the other.
122. Similarly, they typically underestimate the level of courage they might
show in the face of emergencies. See Loewenstein & Schkade, supra note 120, at
93. Thus, their choices to avoid certain high-meaning, high-risk settings (e.g.,




be what I have been calling "weakly perfectionist:" certain
reflective or evaluative positions are thought to be better
than others. The aspect of our observing selves that looks
back from a distance (in reflective equilibrium) or forward
(from a detached, uninvolved planner's perspective) is
thought to be the part whose assessments count,123 not the
self that is (arguably) most engaged and present in the
moment.
I suspect most people intuitively understand that we
form distinct preferences when aroused and when calm.
Less well understood is that other distinct psychological
states have the same sorts of influence on choice and
preference formation. Moreover, I suspect that reactions to
the prudence of making choices under one or the other of
these less transparent influences are considerably less
strongly held or widely shared than (what I see as
inadequately self-critical but widely shared) reactions to the
choice between "cold" and "hot" decision backdrops. For
instance, people choosing a large number of goods at a
particular point in time exhibit what might (pejoratively) be
called a diversification bias, compared to those who choose
from among the same goods seriatim. Thus, if students are
asked to pick what snack they will eat in each class over the
next three weeks, they are more likely to choose different
snacks for each week's class than if they are asked to choose
the snack for each day at the beginning of that day's class.124
123. More generally, it is possible, but I think unavailing, to identify
prudent choices with those that remain most stable over time, once alternatives
have been reflected upon. Certainly, moral philosophers like Rawls have argued
that it is better to trust moral sentiments that are stable in reflective
equilibrium than mere intuitions. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 48-51
(1971). I think, though, that stable judgments may well be more hedonically
problematic than unstable ones. Think, once more, about the food disgust
examples: once we know the provenance of food we think of as disgusting, we
might well be unable to eat it even though it would be in our hedonic interest to
do so (e.g., if we would otherwise starve on some hypothetical desert island).
Not only is it bad to be more informed (of the food's provenance), it is bad to
arrive at the stable equilibrium point. For a fuller discussion, see Mark Kelman,
Problematic Perhaps, but Not Irrational, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1273, 1284-86 (2002).
124. See Itmar Simonson, The Effect of Purchase Quantity and Timing on
Variety-Seeking Behavior, 27 J. MARKETING RES. 150 (1990). For a related
finding, see Daniel Read & George Loewenstein, Diversification Bias:
Explaining the Discrepancy in Variety Seeking between Combined and
Separated Choices, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 45 (1995) (finding
that children selecting Halloween candy "diversify" their candy portfolios when
offered two distinct candies at a single house but select their favorite candy two
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To the degree that people regret, ex post, the decision to
diversity, and to the extent we believe that this regret
bespeaks actual hedonic loss, then the seriatim choice could
be described as more prudent. But my point is that it could
only be described as more prudent in the very limited and
ultimately non-procedural sense that it appears to have
turned out to be hedonically superior. I cannot imagine that
any of us have an instinct that seriatim choices are more
deliberate or deeply considered. To the contrary, if people
share any weak intuition on this issue, I suspect it would be
that the person who "plans" over a longer period is being
more thoughtful and prudent than the person who makes
one decision at a time.
Similarly, most of us are unaware of the degree to
which curiosity drives our choices. Subjects are more likely
to choose to receive the answers to ten geography questions
rather than an attractive candy bar once they have seen
and tried to answer all the questions than when they have
seen only a single randomly sampled question (which might
give them some idea about whether they already know the
answers to the questions). They also underestimate how
likely they are to choose to satiate their curiosity rather
than appetite.'25 Thus, choices made when one is not curious
might differ from those made when curious, but it is
difficult even to imagine why one set of choices would be
viewed as more prudent than the other. If one tried to
remain committed to procedural accounts, it is easy enough
to imagine making the argument that curiosity is just the
sort of short-term impulsive itch-that-needs-scratching that
leads to imprudent decisions or just the opposite-that
people who are curious are intellectually engaged and alive
in just the way that a prudent decision maker should be.
In sum, we neither know what information we need nor
when we are prudent without knowing whether the choices
we have made-given the information we had, given the
degree of prudence we showed-"worked out" for the best.
Preference-utilitarianism cannot be rescued by invoking
pure procedure.
successive times if offered one piece of candy at two successive houses; thus,
people diversify less when they make seriatim choices than single choices,
whether the single choice extends over time or not.)
125. See George Loewenstein, The Psychology of Curiosity: A Review and
Reinterpretation, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 75 (1994); Loewenstein & Schkade, supra




Subjective welfarism is attractive both because it
acknowledges what seems to be a relatively uncontroversial
factual observation-people's tastes are indeed diverse-
and a reasonable normative premise-individuals are
ultimately subjects, legitimately concerned above all with
living a life that is satisfying in their own eyes, rather than
objects meant to meet some outside observer's goals. But we
inevitably define philosophical positions-including
subjective welfarism-in opposition to alternative views,
and when we attempt to draw a sharp contrast between
welfarist and perfectionist principles, I believe we fail.
This is true in part simply because the observer's
decision to attend to welfare must ultimately be grounded
in the perfectionist belief that it is worthwhile to advance
welfarist goals, rather than other goals. But what I have
emphasized in this paper is that it is more strikingly true
because the concept of subjective welfare is at core jumbled
and internally contradictory; only by recourse to what I
have called "weak perfectionism" can it be made coherent.
Hedonic utilitarians-including the new hedonic
psychologists in their most expansive, intellectually
"imperialistic" moments-assume, quite unpersuasively,
that people inexorably seek momentary pleasure (or more
instances of "approaching" rather than "avoiding" their
circumstances) as the end of life. We can reject this claim on
both philosophical and empirical psychological grounds.
Philosophically, there are two core problems with the
claim. First, it is incompatible with the subjectivism and
respect for diversity that best justifies subjective welfarism
altogether. People may reasonably seek to live lives that are
neither dominated by pleasure nor approach. Second, it
rests on a partially dissolved view of the person that is both
unpersuasive and, more striking, incompatible with
attending to any individual's welfare rather than the sum
total of painful and pleasurable experiences in the world,
regardless of their locus. People may well seek lives that
are viewed as satisfying from a variety of more "integrated"
perspectives. When we attempt to maximize an agent's
welfare, what we can do (at best) is to maximize how well
off she is from one such perspective, but our decision to
attend to one of the numerous perspectives the agent could
adopt reflects weak perfectionist ideals. Psychologically, the
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claim is implausible given the wide variety of
incommensurable and non-scaled positive and negative
emotional states that we observe and the wide variety of
biological roles that happiness and unhappiness play.
Preference utilitarians can avoid this difficulty in
hedonic utilitarianism by remaining agnostic about
whether people do or should seek any particular sensations.
But satisfying preferences does not, by itself, make people
well-off. An agent's preferences can be satisfied without
affecting the agent at all (e.g., if she had died before they
were satisfied), and, more commonly, satisfying them can
fail to improve her experience because they are simply
mistaken predictions of the hedonic impact of the chosen
end-state. Preference utilitarians purport to solve this
problem by respecting only procedurally valorized
preferences-those preferences dubbed informed and
prudent. But the psychology literature helps explicate a
familiar philosophical point. Information is neither
intrinsically valuable (given a subjective welfarist world
view) nor does getting more information inevitably make us
choose things that make us happier. Moreover, although
choices are distinct given distinct background conditions, it
is not sensible to call the decisions made given one
particular backdrop more prudent without regard to
whether the hedonic impact of the decision is superior.
Thus, the decision to respect a certain class of
preferences is either based on a covert perfectionist
lionization of a certain procedural posture-people are more
"fully realized," whether they are "happier" or not, if they
make "cold" choices rather than "hot" ones, it fulfills our
nature as highly "cognitive" creatures if we are as informed
as we can be in developing desires-or more plausibly,
based on peeking at the hedonic impact of the choice. A
decision is prudent not because it was made in certain
settings nor adequately informed because the decision
maker had a certain level of information about the world. It
is prudent or informed if it turned out well, by the lights of
the hedonic utilitarian (whom the preference utilitarian
rightly dismissed as being too covertly perfectionist to
satisfy a true subjectivist's aims).
What that means is that hedonic utiltarianism-with
its inevitable perfectionism-is ultimately where we must
wind up if we are to remain committed to welfarism. The"observer" who purports merely to sit back, uninvolved, and
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tote up subjective reactions will inexorably ask some
questions and omit others, or "count" the answers to some
questions as more expressive of the "sort of welfare that
matters." Subjective welfare, the hero of utilitarianism and
policy science, is a unicorn.

